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Enforcement of the
Reconstruction Amendments
Alexander Tsesis*
Abstract
This Article analyzes the delicate balance of congressional
and judicial authority granted by the Reconstruction
Amendments. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments vest Congress with powers to enforce civil rights,
equal treatment, and civic participation. Their reach extends
significantly beyond the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ narrow
construction of congressional authority. In recent years, the
Court has struck down laws that helped secure voter rights,
protect religious liberties, and punish age or disability
discrimination. Those holdings encroach on the amendments’
allocated powers of enforcement.
Textual, structural, historical, and normative analyses
provide profound insights into the appropriate roles of the
Supreme Court and Congress in achieving aspirations of the
Second Founding. The framework that emerges requires the
judiciary to defer to legitimate legislative functions in enforcing
racial equality, dignitary justice, and access to the ballot box.
*
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Congress’s discretion extends to safeguards for fundamental
rights, civil liberties, and political representation. Rational basis
review is appropriate when Congress advances autonomy,
equality, and franchise. However, when courts safeguard equal
enjoyment of fundamental rights against legislative
encroachments, those three amendments require heightened
judicial scrutiny of adverse state actions.
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INTRODUCTION
The Reconstruction Amendments realigned the balance of
power between the judicial and legislative branches. The
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments empowered Congress
to enforce national civil rights policies. They broke with the
protections of slavery that had been built into the original
Constitution,1 which the Supreme Court had upheld.2 The
Fifteenth Amendment, in turn, advanced anti-racist civic
participation.
Despite the monumental alterations to the Constitution,
less than a decade after their ratification, the Supreme Court
began to chip away at legislative authority to enforce federal
civil rights law.3 In recent cases, such as City of Boerne v. Flores4
and Shelby County v. Holder,5 the Court continued to interfere
with core structural features of constitutional reconstruction.6
The Court has further prevented lawmakers from enforcing
laws pertaining to civil remedies for the victims of sexual
violence,7 age and handicap discrimination,8 minority voting

1. See Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights &
the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REV. 307, 321 (2004) (discussing clauses
of the Constitution that protected the institution of slavery).
2. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 625–26 (1842)
(overturning Edward Prigg’s conviction under state law for kidnapping a Black
mother and her children in order to return them to a Maryland owner).
3. See
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (holding
unconstitutional the Civil Rights Act of 1875).
4. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
5. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
6. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (holding that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 exceeded Congress’s power under the Fourteenth
Amendment because it “contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain
separation of powers and the federal balance”); Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557
(holding that § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was unconstitutional).
7. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
8. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 62 (2000).
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preclearance,9 campaign financing,10 and matching campaign
contributions.11
The Reconstruction Amendments augmented legislative
powers and were meant to check the judiciary from repeating
the monumental injustice of Dred Scott v. Sandford.12 Contrary
to their framing purposes, the Court has continued to erode the
Reconstruction Amendments’ enforcement authority in cases
like United States v. Cruikshank,13 the Civil Rights Cases,14 and
Shelby County v. Holder.15 Alexander Hamilton long ago pointed
out that the judiciary should exercise judgment but not impose
its will on the people.16 The Court often acts without due
constitutional restraints in matters where the Constitution
appears to grant Congress the leading role in formulating
policies.17 Justice Kagan commented on this phenomenon in a
dissent, asserting that by reserving to itself exclusive

9. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557.
10. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442
(2014).
11. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S.
721, 728 (2011).
12. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 418–19 (1857) (holding that Blacks were not
citizens of the United States).
13. 92 U.S. 542, 559 (1875) (holding unconstitutional a federal criminal
statute that prevented Blacks from exercising their constitutional rights).
14. 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (holding unconstitutional the desegregation
provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1875).
15. 570 U.S. at 535 (striking the § 4(b) coverage formula of the Voting
Rights Act because the law violated the “principle that all States enjoy equal
sovereignty”).
16. Alexander Hamilton set out the theory of judicial review in Federalist
78. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Marbury, Marshall, and the Politics of
Constitutional Judgment, 89 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1209–10 (2003) (contrasting
Hamilton’s competence and Marshall’s institutional, textual defense of judicial
review).
17. The doctrine of constitutional review requires courts to neither
“‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it’” nor to “‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’” Wash. State Grange
v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (quoting Ashwander
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
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interpretive authority, the Supreme Court has turned the
Justices into “black-robed rulers overriding citizens’ choices.”18
As matters currently stand, the Supreme Court’s
interpretive exclusivity of Reconstruction powers lacks
meaningful checks against judicial supremacy.19 Instead,
Congress should be able to define and follow through with policy
priorities consistent with constitutional text, structure, history,
and norms. The Court cannot act as the philosophical guardian
of constitutional morality.20 It is, rather, a branch of government
that requires checks and balances to limit its encroachment into
legitimate lawmaking.21 The Reconstruction Amendments

18. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S.
Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
19. U.S. CONST. art. V. On the difficulty of amending the United States
Constitution see Sanford Levinson, Still Complacent After All These Years:
Some Rumination on the Continuing Need for a “New Political Science” (Not to
Mention A New Way of Teaching Law Students About What Is Truly Most
Important About the Constitution), 89 B.U. L. REV. 409, 422 (2009) (“Article V
makes amendment extraordinarily difficult if not functionally impossible.”).
20. 1 PLATO, The Republic, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 503, 764 (B.
Jowett trans., Random House 1937) (1892); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242
(1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution does not constitute us as
‘Platonic Guardians’ nor does it vest in this Court the authority to strike down
laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social policy,
‘wisdom,’ or ‘common sense.’”); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958)
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly
do not. If they were in charge, I should miss the stimulus of living
in a society where I have, at least theoretically, some part in the
direction of public affairs.
The journalist Linda Greenhouse quotes Ruth Bader Ginsburg during her
Senate confirmation hearings, “we must always remember that we live in a
democracy that can be destroyed if judges take it upon themselves to rule as
Platonic guardians.” Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: A Sense of
Judicial Limits, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 1993), at A1.
21. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31,
39–40 (2005)
[T]he U.S. Supreme Court is well on its way to becoming a political
court . . . . Constitutional cases in the open area are aptly regarded
as “political” because the Constitution is about politics and because
cases in the open area are not susceptible of confident evaluation
on the basis of professional legal norms. They can be decided only
on the basis of a political judgment, and a political judgment cannot
be called right or wrong by reference to legal norms.
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provide that the American people’s representatives in Congress
take the lead in the advancement of life, liberty, and the pursuit
of freedom. This Article has significant implications to federal
civil rights and civil liberties laws affecting indigent, elderly,
and handicapped litigants.
Part I reviews leading methods of constitutional
interpretation, beginning with the popular constitutionalism of
Mark Tushnet and Jeremy Waldron. Their arguments against
judicial interpretive exclusivity are juxtaposed with David
Strauss’s common law constitutionalism and Ronald Dworkin’s
moral constitutionalism. After critiquing those approaches, the
Article argues for a balanced interpretation of Reconstruction
powers.
Part II explains Reconstruction power in the context of
heightened judicial scrutiny. It focuses on three areas of review
related to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments. Predicates for heightened judicial review are
modulated by the antecedents, principles, enumerations, and
liberal equality norms consistent with the Reconstruction
Amendments.
Part III surveys Supreme Court rulings that undermine
congressional enforcement of those three constitutional
amendments. It discusses cases of judicial supremacy that
prevent Congress from enacting robust civil rights and civil
liberties laws. Part IV explores the limits of interpretive finality
in those two areas. It describes when judicial deference must
give way to congressional policies consistent with the structure,
history, text, and norms of constitutional reconstruction.
I.

WEAK OR STRONG JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Supreme Court has been the final arbiter of
constitutional interpretation since the Early Republic, but it
only declared its interpretational supremacy during the Civil
Rights Era. Marbury v. Madison22 set the basic structure of
judicial review and articulated the seminal statement of
constitutional interpretation.23 However, nowhere in Marbury

22.
23.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 177.
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did Chief Justice Marshall assert that the Supreme Court is or
should be the exclusive interpreter of the Constitution. In the
alternative, each department of government may be said to have
the institutional competence to make rational decisions toward
legitimate ends.
The Court took a definitive step toward exercising judicial
supremacy in its 1958 Cooper v. Aaron24 decision, in a case that
was essential for desegregation in Arkansas and throughout the
South, declaring “the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”25
Thereafter, a muscular version of judicial review functioned as
a two-edged sword that later decisions wielded to both advance
and repel civil and political freedoms.26 This Part of the Article
explains how the Court developed several doctrines consistent
with the principles of political and civil Reconstruction. Part III
then turns to cases where, to the contrary, the Justices pared
down Congress’s efforts to safeguard autonomy, equality, and
franchise. Part IV reconciles the polarities by offering a theory
to balance structural, normative, textual, and historical features
of constitutional reconstruction that best preserves judicial
review without compromising legislative civil rights
enforcement. Before turning to how the Court has expanded and
contracted the aspirational enforcement of reconstruction

24. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
25. Id. at 18. Cooper relied on judicial supremacy to advance civil rights,
requiring a public school to desegregate pursuant to the equal protection
ruling in Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Id. at 4. The
Court followed up with a series of per curiam desegregation opinions that often
cited Brown, but rarely provided any depth of analysis. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 61–62 (1963) (per curiam) (relying on Brown to find that
the segregation of public facilities, such as courtrooms, is constitutionally
impermissible); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 351, 353 (1962) (per
curiam) (holding that public segregation in airport dining facilities violates the
Fourteenth Amendment); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93, 94–95 (5th
Cir. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (vacating a decision that
had declared the segregation of public golf courses to be constitutional);
Dawson v. Mayor of Balt., 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir. 1955), aff’d, 350 U.S.
877 (1955) (per curiam) (finding that racial segregation of public beaches and
bathhouses was not constitutionally permissible); Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F.
Supp. 204, 205-06 (E.D. La. 1963), aff’d, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (per curiam)
(granting injunctive relief for the desegregation of a city auditorium).
26. See infra Part I.B.
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norms, the Article addresses arguments made by the skeptics of
strong judicial review27 and proponents of it.28 The truth lies
somewhere in between, explicitly and implicitly in the altered
structure of government created by the Reconstruction
Amendments. The premise of this Article is that the virtual
judicial veto that strict scrutiny review represents is valid when
the Court protects civil rights but not when it strikes civil rights
legislation. The first section of Part I begins by scrutinizing
divergent schools of thought on judicial review. The second
section then proposes an original approach grounded in
Reconstruction principles of representative democracy.
Deference, not judicial veto, is needed in cases reviewing
representative governments’ efforts to address injustices or
discriminations.
A.

Popular Constitutionalism

Mark Tushnet formulates a theory for “taking the
Constitution away from the courts.”29 His book on the subject
advocates to “reject the general theory of judicial supremacy.”30
He suggests retaining legislative authority in constitutional
enforcement but offers little explanation of what constitutional
changes would need to be made. He does not, for example, point
to specific portions of the Constitution that set limits on
Congress. Nor does he explain how federalist considerations
would play a role. It may be that amending the existing
Constitution is the only option, but Article V creates significant
barriers against passing and then ratifying any textual changes

27. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
COURTS (1999). For further study on popular constitutionalism see
generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Jeremy Waldron, The
Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006)
[hereinafter The Core of the Case].
28. See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010);
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996).
29. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at i.
30. Id. at 13.
THE
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to the Constitution.31 Tushnet speculates only so far as to say
“[p]erhaps defiance may be appropriate only when the
Declaration [of Independence’s] human rights principles are at
stake.”32 Tushnet further asserts that the principles of the
Declaration remain foundational to constitutional structure
that has the people conducting “thin Constitution’s meaning”
through their representatives.33 Tushnet does not, however,
provide details about how reconstructed judicial review would
be constituted and operationalized.34 Nor does he explain to
what extent stare decisis and doctrines generally would be
honored in a system without judicial finality.
An alternative criticism of judicial review is tendered by
Jeremy Waldron. He begins with the premise that “quite apart
from the outcomes it generates, judicial review is democratically
illegitimate.”35 In his most expositive work on the matter, Law
and Disagreement, Waldron writes that distrusting the people’s
political will is inconsistent with “the idea of rights” that “is
based on a view of the human individual as essentially a
thinking agent.”36 Society’s decisionmaking must be built on
“the imperative that one be treated as an equal . . . .”37 In a
democracy, the people’s capacity “of evolving a shared and
reliable sense of right and wrong, justice and injustice, in their
conversations with one another” is inconsistent with

31. See U.S. CONST. art. V (providing that a constitutional amendment
requires two thirds of both houses of Congress to propose amendment and
three fourths of the states to approve it); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitution
Day Lecture: American Constitutionalism, Almost (but Not Quite) Version 2.0,
65 ME. L. REV. 77, 92 (2012); Levinson, supra note 19, at 422 (“Article V makes
amendment extraordinarily difficult if not functionally impossible . . . .”).
32. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 13.
33. Id. at 14, 51–53. See generally ALEXANDER TSESIS, FOR LIBERTY AND
EQUALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE DECLARATION (2012).
34. Tushnet’s suggestion appears to be the unlikely solution of an
“override” of judicial holdings by “two-thirds majority in both houses” of
Congress. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 175.
35. The Core of the Case, supra note 27, at 1346.
36. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 250 (1991) [hereinafter
LAW AND DISAGREEMENT].
37. The Core of the Case, supra note 27, at 1375.
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“announc[ing] that the products of any deliberative process are
to be mistrusted.”38
Waldron’s criticism homes in on the disconnect between
democratic institutions and judicial finality. The review of the
judiciary might, to the contrary, be said to be democracy
enforcing. Indeed, that is a critical point of John Hart Ely’s
“representation-reinforcing mode” of interpretation.39 Waldron’s
theory thus does not adequately address circumstances in which
courts get right the representation-reinforcing facets of
government for the people. Waldron recognizes that the
legislative process may be “more complex and laborious” but is
confident that the extra time needed to resolve constitutional
matters “is not like the affront to democracy involved in
removing issues from a vote altogether and assigning them to a
separate non-representative forum like a court.”40 The Supreme
Court can itself slow a rush to popular legislation harming the
very matters Carolene Products41 recognized in the judicial
province. Those being protection of discrete and insular
minorities, fundamental rights, and democratic equality.42
Balance should be drawn to reflect the nature and function
of political institutes. In some cases Waldron is undoubtedly
correct to say that the legislative process should be “a noisy
scenario in which men and women of high spirit argue
passionately and vociferously about what rights we have, what
justice requires, and what the common good amounts to,
motivated in their disagreement not by what’s in it for them but
by a desire to get it right.”43 Here we may think of law struck
down in United States v. Morrison44 or Shelby County v.
Holder.45 Missing is recognition that the Supreme Court itself
often advances civil rights against local prejudices and political
intolerance. Into this second group must be grouped Brown v.
38. LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 36, at 222.
39. John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of
Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451, 474 (1978).
40. LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 36, at 305–06.
41. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
42. See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
43. LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 36, at 305.
44. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
45. 570 U.S. 529 (2013); see infra Part IV.C.1–2.
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Board of Education,46 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,47
Katzenbach v. McClung,48 and Obergefell v. Hodges.49 And
Waldron’s and Tushnet’s theories leave courts too weak to check
unbridled uses of state or federal powers.50
B.

Muscular Judicial Interpretation

While Tushnet and Waldron argue that constitutional
democracy requires legislatures to be the final arbiters of
constitutional meaning, there can be little doubt that any
drastic change to the current system of judicial finality could
lead to instability of social order.51 Among those arguing for the
stability of retaining judicially driven constitutional meaning,
Professor David Strauss stresses that the current system “works
well enough, and it would be too costly and risky to reopen the
question whether, abstractly considered, it is the best possible
arrangement.”52 Far from needing to be rectified, he argues that
a common law process for interpreting the Constitution best

46. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (stating that “such segregation is a denial of
the equal protection of the laws”).
47. 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (enforcing application of the Civil Rights Act
to a motel by denying their ability to discriminate based on race).
48. 379 U.S. 294, 305 (applying Heart of Atlanta Motel to a desegregation
case involving a local restaurant).
49. 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (concluding that under the Equal Protection
Clause “couples of the same-sex may not be deprived” of the right to marry).
50. But see The Core of the Case, supra note 27, at 1351 (“[A] core
argument against judicial review that is independent of both its historical
manifestations and questions about its particular effects . . . .”).
51. Tushnet admits as much, writing, “We really cannot know how
Congress would perform if the courts exited . . . .” TUSHNET, supra note 27, at
55. For other scholars, stability of stare decisis rationalizes its continued
reliance on judicial review. Professor Richard Fallon, for example, argues that
the dysfunctionality of the legislative process justifies judicial veto. See
RICHARD FALLON JR., THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE INVENTION
AND LOGIC OF STRICT JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 199 (2019) (arguing that “courts are
likely to be more reliable in identifying relevant moral and legal rights”).
Missing from Fallon’s account, however, is recognition that the court too can
be dysfunctional.
52. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877, 913–14 (1996).
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sheds light on actual constitutional practice.53 He contends that
the U.S. constitutional system “has become a common law
system, one in which precedent and past practices are, in their
own way, as important as the written U.S. Constitution itself.”54
This is not only a call for continuing current judicial supremacy
but for embracing it as indispensable to an evolving
Constitution.55
Strauss provides few details about the conditions
appropriate for deviating from precedent. His formula relies on
good faith in judges, removed from the partisanship of
legislative policy making.56 Ultimately, he is ambiguous about
how to apply and alter opinions that encroach on the power of
other branches of government. Courts “should think twice
about . . . judgments of right and wrong when they are
inconsistent with what has gone before”; interpretive shifts are
justified when, “on reflection, we are sufficiently confident that
we are right, and . . . the stakes are high enough.”57 Left
unexplained is how to determine that the stakes are high
enough, how judges can eschew subjective judgments, to what
extent popular values should play a role, the extent to which
shifts in precedents should take place, how the public will accept
the shifts, whether the shifts in judgments can be based on
shifts of members on the court, and more. Strauss’s account
leaves finality to judges, irrespective of whether they are
expanding rights—as in Brown v. Board of Education58—or
contracting them—as in Shelby County v. Holder.59

53. See id. at 887 (“[W]hen people interpret the Constitution, they rely
not just on the text but also on the elaborate body of law that has
developed . . . .”).
54. STRAUSS, supra note 28, at 3.
55. See id. at 35 (“Those precedents, traditions, and understandings form
an indispensable part of . . . the [C]onstitution as it actually operates, in
practice.”).
56. Strauss, supra note 52, at 898.
57. Id. at 896–97.
58. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (expanding the rights of Black students by
finding segregated schools “inherently unequal”).
59. 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (contracting the protections provided
under the Voting Rights Act).
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Likewise, he leaves largely unelaborated the attitude and
ideology judges should take in interpreting the Constitution
with scant fleshing out of what Strauss calls the “attitudes of
humility and cautious empiricism.”60 It leaves uncertainty in
how to assess the Court’s work and how to rectify judicial
overreaching. The judiciary engages in what Strauss
characterizes as an evolutionary process that relies heavily on
earlier precedents and demonstrates “unmistakable concern
with matters of policy and political morality.”61 This statement
relates to how judges go about creating constitutional common
law in areas like free speech, but process, precedent, and
political morality lack concreteness to render them immune
from legislative correction. In his common law constitutional
order, the people have little role in the unfolding of
constitutional change; indeed, judicial finality disempowers
them from effectively relying on representative politics.
Judges must rely on reason in matters of constitutional
interpretation. “We are not final because we are infallible, but
we are infallible only because we are final,” as Justice Jackson
jocundly put it.”62 And we know that reason is fallible. With no
meaningful inter-branch oversight, the Justices make final
pronouncements on matters as consequential as process, equal
protection, and voting.63 Appellate review can correct judicial
error, but the Supreme Court remains atop a hierarchy of
interpretation. The legislature plays no significant role in
constitutional development in Strauss’s scheme.64 This runs
counter to the Reconstruction Amendments’ grants of necessary
and proper authority in § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and § 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment.65 The judiciary is left to rely on reason alone to

60. STRAUSS, supra note 28, at 40.
61. Id. at 62.
62. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
63. See, e.g., Holder, 570 U.S. at 553 (stating that the protections of the
Voting Rights Act are no longer justified).
64. See STRAUSS, supra note 28, at 62–76 (emphasizing the role of the
Court in First Amendment application and describing the current standard as
a “product of common law evolution”).
65. See supra notes 3–11 and accompanying text.
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determine what is “fair or is better policy,”66 with no
congressional ability to right judicial overreaching.
Constitutional common law leaves uncertainty about the
meaning of the nation’s fundamental documents. Supporters of
judicial finality notoriously arrive at divergent conclusions
about cases that often reflect prior political choices.67 Ronald
Dworkin, another prominent advocate of strong judicial finality,
argues that judges should identify the theory that, among
conflicting alternatives, “is morally the strongest.”68 He writes
that courts are designed to function as “forums of principle.”69
Drawing from the Fourteenth Amendment, Dworkin argues
that the central political ideal embodied in the Constitution is
justice in a “society of citizens both equal and free,”70 where
judges must be constrained by the principle of “equal concern
and respect.”71 Where there is social disagreement about the
principled outcome of cases, he argues that “courts should take
final authority to interpret the Constitution.”72
Dworkin’s approach fails in an important respect to justify
a Supreme Court’s veto. On why the judiciary should have the
last say in constitutional interpretation, his argument is
circular and unconvincing, “[J]udicial review is not available to
check the decision of the highest appellate court; if it were the

66. David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 969, 974 (2008)
A common law approach insists that judges are sharply limited by
precedent, but it does not suggest that precedent always determines
the outcome of a case—obviously not—and, more important, a
common law approach to constitutional interpretation allows
judges and other interpreters to say that part of the reason for a
result is that that result is more fair or is better policy.
67. See Susan R. Burgess, Beyond Instrumental Politics: The New
Institutionalism, Legal Rhetoric, & Judicial Supremacy, 25 POLITY 445, 455
(1993) (“Leading scholars as disparate as Raoul Berger, Ronald Dworkin,
Robert Bork, John Hart Ely, and Michael Perry disagree about what the Court
should say when it speaks, but they agree that once spoken, the Court’s words
are final.”).
68. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 404 (2013).
69. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 69–71 (1985).
70. DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 73.
71. Id. at 74.
72. Id. at 12.
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court would not be the highest”;73 to rephrase it, the highest
court is the highest court because it is the highest court. That
begs the question why judicial error cannot or should not be
appealed to the legislature in cases of abuse of judicial authority.
Where the government is by the people, through their elected
representatives, it at least follows that their voice is relevant to
the evolving meaning of the Constitution. Dworkin postulates
that, “It might seem natural to say at least this: the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses give the court no power to strike
down statutes that no reasonable person could think deeply
unjust.”74 But what mechanism there is to overturn judicial
overreaching, Dworkin does not say.
Dworkin’s view of judges’ articulation of law is idealistic.
They are not to be willful, subjective, nor capricious.
Adjudication, rather, involves moral and political considerations
that do not allow for arbitrary judgements.75 A judge’s function
is as a moral philosopher who makes value judgements while
seeking to articulate the “objectively best account that can be
given of all the concepts, values, and ideas that the law instructs
him to consider.”76 Like legislators, judges are prone to errors.
As Dworkin recognizes, even “an authoritative court makes the
wrong decision about what the democratic conditions require.”77
Under a system where judicial interpretation is inevitably
subject to judges’ human foibles and lapses, absolute finality is
neither the only nor necessarily the best approach. Legislative
judgements should be measured against fundamental principles
of constitutional law’s commitment to equality, liberty, and the
general welfare. The judicial branch need not always hold a
trump card in the matter. A balance is needed between the
branches rather than automatic conclusiveness. The
proportional evaluation of judicial review and legislative policies
73. Ronald Dworkin, Response, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1086 (2010).
74. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 210 (2006).
75. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 235–58 (1986) (explaining that a
judge “must choose between eligible interpretations . . . from the standpoint of
political morality”).
76. Jeremy Waldron, Planning for Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 883, 900
(2011) (discussing Dworkin’s views on objective adjudication that involve
judicial moral sensibility and precedential analogy).
77. DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 32.
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is possible, as I show in Part IV, in one that allows for a review
protecting rights against the overreaching of both courts and
Congress. There is no fault to wanting courts to be “forums of
principle,”78 but that is merely ideal. In practice, there are many
circumstances under which decisions are based on principles of
inequality. Ableman v. Booth,79 Dred Scott,80 Plessy v.
Ferguson,81 and Bradwell v. Illinois,82 come most readily to
mind. And some mechanism should allow popular majorities to
overturn adjudications detrimental to equal rights, autonomy,
and the common good.
Having discussed leading theories of judicial review, Parts
II and III next turn to existing doctrines. Neither renunciation
of judicial review—as Tushnet and Waldron advocate83—nor
judicial exclusivity—as Strauss and Dworkin suggest84—suffice.
Separation-of-powers concerns inform observers and courts
about when heightened scrutiny is appropriate and, on the other
hand, when rational basis review best achieves principles of
constitutional reconstruction. The Court’s mixed record on civil
rights demonstrates that a balance of power is needed for the
judiciary and Congress to help achieve the aspirations of
Reconstruction.

78. RONALD DWORKIN, The Forum of Principle, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
33 (1985).
79. 62 U.S. 506, 522–26 (1858) (holding constitutional the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1850 with its provision requiring state citizens to help to arrest
fugitives).
80. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404, 426 (1857) (denying both the validity of
Black citizenship and the congressional authority to prohibit state sanctioned
forms of racial discrimination).
81. 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (deciding that forced segregation on public
carriers did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
82. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873) (holding that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant the federal
government the authority to control states’ licensing regulations, even when
they discriminated between men and women).
83. See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 28–55, 68–72 and accompanying text.
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RECONSTRUCTED JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Tushnet and Waldron go too far in resisting judicial review
given the many cases that protect individual rights.85 The cases
that follow demonstrate how popular interests can be advanced
by judicial interpretation. They show the relevance of judicial
review to the people’s interest in a government ruled by the legal
principle consistent with equal protection and republican
governance. The judiciary has played an important role in
advancing the constitutional policies behind the Reconstruction
Amendments.
To that end, the Supreme Court has articulated key
doctrines to safeguard fundamental rights, equality, and voting
privileges through analysis of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments. This Part parses judicial reliance on
Reconstruction principles, structures, and norms. It surveys
judicial reliance on Reconstruction Amendment principles to
strengthen rights, equality, and voting doctrines.
A.

Early Developments

The Court’s power to closely scrutinize matters concerning
autonomy, equality, and franchise stems from three conditions
the Court first set forth in footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene
Products Co.86 That identified three circumstances under which
the Court might subject law “to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment
than are most other types of legislation.”87 Special constitutional
concerns arise, wrote Justice Stone for the Supreme Court,
when at stake are “specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten Amendments,” “prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities,” or “political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”88 That
statement, which is directly relevant to a Reconstruction
Amendment-based review, reflects textual, structural,

85.
86.
87.
88.

See supra Part I.A.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Id.
Id.

866

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849 (2021)

normative, and historical reasons for closely scrutinizing state
actions.
The Court maintains constitutional norms as a necessary
component of representative democracy by checking majorities
from abusing individuals’ equal rights to enjoy personal
autonomy and general welfare. Justice Blackmun characterized
the famous footnote’s formula as being the grand “moment the
Court began constructing modern equal protection doctrine.”89
The footnote 4 signaled even broader implications for civil rights
and civil liberties enforcement. Professor Richard Fallon
explains that the footnote set in motion a complicated system of
analysis: “Even after triggering rights are identified,
determining whether they are outweighed by competing
governmental interests often requires a serious, sometimes
difficult comparison of individual interests with potentially
countervailing governmental interests.”90
Pursuant to the Carolene Products formula, the Warren
Court developed a body of law for reviewing state actions that
encroached on personal liberties, just treatment, and political
engagement. A variety of cases relied on searching scrutiny to
overturn special burdens on marginalized groups with claims for
equality, substantive liberty, and effective political
representation.91 In those cases, judicial review operates as a
corrective mechanism returning power to people whose vital
concerns have not been met through ordinary political channels.
In an early case of increased judicial review, the Court did
not rely on heightened scrutiny in Brown v. Board of Education;
rather, it categorically found that segregated public schools
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.92 With that holding the Court was empowered to
act against state practices degrading persons because of race.
89. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see id. at 17
(majority opinion) (holding that the state university violated the Supremacy
Clause by policy, denying in-state tuition to nonimmigrant resident aliens).
90. FALLON, supra note 51, at 149 (criticizing Professor John Hart Ely’s
interpretation of Carolene Products as being “thin”).
91. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 n.5 (1954) (noting
that the Fourteenth Amendment provides a “positive immunity” from
“unfriendly legislation”).
92. See id. at 495.
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Many progressive decisions followed. The Court relied on
substantive due process and equal protection review to strike
down bans against the sale of contraceptives.93 The same
autonomy principle led the Court to rely on competent reason to
find a rational basis with a bite to strike anti-gay sodomy laws94
and restrictions on same-sex marriage.95 The Court held
unconstitutional laws inconsistent with the enjoyment of
political speech.96 Out of the synthetic recipe first articulated by
Carolene Products Co. also came decisions against unfair
apportionment of voters.97 “One person, one vote” became a key
principle against elective inequalities.98
I turn to several examples to illustrate how the Court’s role
in adjudicating civil rights cases is justified on the context of
American constitutional reconstruction. After exploring these
cases, the Article turns in Part III to judicial encroachment on
congressional Reconstruction powers.
B.

Heightened Judicial Review

The fourth footnote of Carolene Products identified three
justifications for non-deferential judicial review: the protection
of equality, the security of fundamental rights, and the
operation of representative political processes.99 Later holdings
established that in cases where those concerns arise, judges are
to rely on strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or some

93. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (finding
unconstitutional a contraception statute that violated the equal protection of
unmarried people).
94. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (finding that the
Texas anti-sodomy statute furthered “no legitimate state interest”).
95. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (noting that the
laws against same-sex couples “abridge central precepts of equality”).
96. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1964)
(establishing an “actual malice” requirement for defamation against public
officials).
97. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209–11 (1962).
98. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (noting that the Equal
Protection Clause requires “substantially equal state legislative
representation for all citizens”).
99. See supra notes 86–98 and accompanying text.
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categorical rule.100 On closer examination, constitutional
analysis relies not on simple tests but on text, history, value,
and precedent. These factors identify whether heightened
review is warranted to protect a discrete and insular group, a
right secured by the Constitution, or representative
government. The cases below help demonstrate why rejection of
judicial review, for which Mark Tushnet and Jeremy Waldron
argue,101 would be an unwarranted disruption of judicial and
legislative equilibrium.
1.

Fundamental Rights

The Supreme Court first altered Carolene Products’s “more
exacting judicial scrutiny” into “strict scrutiny,” which it first
articulated in Skinner v. Oklahoma102 to strike down a criminal
sterilization statute.103 But Justice Douglas, who wrote the
majority opinion in the latter, left to later cases to parse out the
meaning of “strict scrutiny” review.104 The structure of the test
was fleshed out further in the 1969 Shapiro v. Thompson105
opinion, where the Court relied on strict scrutiny to strike down
100. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1267, 1303–05, 1312–14 (2007) (comparing strict scrutiny analyses and
categories).
101. See supra Part I.
102. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
103. See id. at 541. Chief Justice Stone and Justice Jackson allude to
Carolene Products in their concurrences. See id. at 544 (Stone, C.J.,
concurring); id. at 546 (Jackson, J., concurring) (agreeing that the proposed
Act “denies equal protection of the law”). While Carolene Products rejected
substantive due process analysis, which had by the Second New Deal gone into
disrepute, it offered a way of retaining judicial relevance in matters involving
normative judgments. See David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of
Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 894–95 (2009) (arguing that footnote
four of Carolene Products “was an effort to bury substantive due process while
maintaining a role for the courts”). The Court returned to substantive due
process in the late 1960s. See Bradley P. Jacob, Back to Basics: Constitutional
Meaning and “Tradition”, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 261, 280 (2007). But see Jesse
H. Choper & Stephen F. Ross, The Political Process, Equal Protection, and
Substantive Due Process, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 1012 (2018) (arguing that
“Carolene Products . . . was in part a substantive due process case”).
104. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 543 (leaving the precise solution of the equal
protection issue to the Oklahoma court).
105. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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a restriction on the “fundamental right of interstate
movement.”106 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in the
latter case, found the state lacked compelling state reasons to
exclude indigents from entering the state seeking to receive
valuable public resources.107 While the narrow tailoring test had
not yet made its way into the Shapiro opinion, there was a
resonance to Justice Stone’s awareness in Carolene Products
that the Court must give more careful consideration to
legislation that negatively impacts individuals’ abilities to
exercise rights under “the first ten Amendments, which are
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.”108
More than merely a doctrinal test, Shapiro announced the
structural vision of Reconstruction that incorporated the Bill of
Rights. The majority asserted that the right to travel existed by
“nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of
personal liberty.”109 But it mistakenly traced that right to
antebellum precedent written by Chief Justice Taney, “We are
all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same
community, must have the right to pass and repass through
every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own
states.”110 The Reconstruction Amendments altered the federal
structure of government by expanding the rights of Americans
irrespective of race. The history of Reconstruction is critical to
defining the right to travel.
As early as the 1864 Senate debates on the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, passed pursuant to Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment
authority, Senator John Sherman of Ohio argued that liberty
was more than mere emancipation and extended to the right to
travel.111 This counterposed the antebellum status of

106. Id. at 638.
107. See id. at 631, 634.
108. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
109. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.
110. Id. at 630 (quoting The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492
(1849)).
111. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1865) (“This clause gives
to the citizen of Massachusetts, whatever may be his color, the right of a citizen
of South Carolina, to come and go precisely like any other citizen.”).
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restrictions on slave travel.112 Travel was among the rights
guaranteed by constitutional removal of the badges and
incidents of slavery.113
Moreover, the Thirteenth Amendment granted federal
powers beyond the realm of chattel slavery. Even free Southern
Blacks lived in a world so legally constricted by racial
domination that it offered only a deceptive shadow of freedom.
Their movement was severely restricted. Some Southern states
forbade free Blacks from entering at all, coupling the prohibition
with the imposition of severe fines against offenders. Prior to
the Civil War, South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama were among states that prohibited free Black sailors
to disembark from ships.114 North Carolina forbade them from
traveling beyond the county where they resided.115 Even the
paternalistic form of kindness Southerners gave their slaves
was not afforded to free Blacks. They lived under constant
surveillance, lest they become educated and organized enough
to rebel. Laws throughout the South prohibited them from
assembling, not even for religious services or charitable
purposes.116 Free Blacks often worked in the most menial jobs,

112. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 192–236 (1956) (discussing a range of restrictions under
slavery codes).
113. See HERMAN BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
AND FREEDMEN’S RIGHTS, 1861 TO 1866, at 120 (1976); CONG. GLOBE, 42nd
Cong., 2nd Sess. 844 (1872); id. at 3192 (relating the right to travel to national
citizenship).
114. See MICHAEL A. SCHOEPPNER, MORAL CONTAGION: BLACK ATLANTIC
SAILORS, CITIZENSHIP, AND DIPLOMACY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 146 (2019);
MICHELE REID-VAZQUEZ, THE YEAR OF THE LASH 73 (2011) (describing South
Carolina’s “Negro Seaman’s Act” which gave port cities the authority to
incarcerate Black sailors when they arrived in port until their ship was ready
to disembark); JUDITH KELLEHER SCHAFER, BECOMING FREE, REMAINING FREE
132–33 (2003); Daniel J. Flanigan, The Criminal Law of Slavery and Freedom,
1800–1868, at 206 (1973) (Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University) (on file with the
Rice University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection).
115. STEPHEN A. VINCENT, SOUTHERN SEED, NORTHERN SOIL 11 (1999).
116. See id. (noting that following Nat Turner’s rebellion, North Carolina
restricted free Blacks from preaching the gospel and required that Black
religious services occur “under White supervision”).
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excluded from professions either by cultural or statutory
barriers.117
These nominally free people suffered from many of the same
burdens inflicted on slaves, and the Thirteenth Amendment
sought to end restrictions on movement and their concomitant
denigrations. Its sweep, therefore, stretched to Northern
discriminations as well since free Blacks in the North were
saddled with many of the same discriminations as their
Southern counterparts. During his U.S. tour, Alexis de
Tocqueville remarked that race prejudice was stronger in the
North than it was in the South.118 As with free Blacks in the
South, the movement of Northern Blacks was severely curtailed.
The Court’s power to review restrictions on travel comes from
the historical, structural, and ethical change wrought by the
Reconstruction Amendments.
In 1859, Oregon was the only free state to enter the Union
with a constitutional prohibition against Blacks residing
there.119 In 1851, an Iowa statute prohibited any free Blacks
from entering the state or subjected them to fines, but in a show
of faux compassion the state allowed law-abiding Blacks living
there to remain.120 Iowa followed an established line of Northern
legislation designed to keep Blacks from moving about the
expanding country. Ohio, from 1803, effectively limited the
number of free Blacks who could enter because it was practically
impossible for them to pay the required $500 bond of good
117. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 216–17 (2d ed.
1956).
118. See James L. Crouthamel, Tocqueville’s South, 2 J. EARLY REPUBLIC
381, 396 (1982); Richard W. Resh, Alexis De Tocqueville and the Negro:
Democracy in America Reconsidered, 48 J. NEGRO HIST. 251, 256–57 (1963)
(“Tocqueville described the free Negro’s burdens in his discussion of the
tyranny of public opinion. Theoretically the free Negro could vote, but an
attempt to cast the ballot would result in reprisals.”).
119. See 2 JOHN C. HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES 217 (Negro Univ. Press 1968) (1862); HENRY H. SIMMS, A
DECADE OF SECTIONAL CONTROVERSY, 1851–1861, at 129 (Greenwood Press
1978) (1942) (explaining that in addition to not being permitted to reside in
the state, Blacks “could not hold any real estate, maintain a suit or make a
contract”).
120. See 2 HURD, supra note 119, at 177 (explaining that “free negroes”
living in Iowa are allowed to remain in the state so long as they “have[]
complied with the laws now in force”); SIMMS, supra note 119, at 129.
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behavior.121 The Illinois Constitution of 1848, prohibited entry
to free Black folks.122 An 1853 Illinois law gave this provision
effect, making it a misdemeanor for Blacks and “mulattos” to
enter the state for the purpose of residing there and subjecting
them to a fine or, if unable to pay the $100 to $500 dollars, sale
to forced labor to pay off the fine and court costs.123 Then, just a
month before President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation,
during the state’s 1862 constitutional convention, Illinois
adopted a constitutional article prohibiting Blacks from
immigrating to the state, which passed by a majority of 100,590
popular votes.124 Similar exclusionary provisions were found in
Indiana law.125 Northern Blacks needed the liberating
provisions of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendment almost as much as Southern slaves.
Reconstruction altered the federal structure of government
by giving Blacks free egress and ingress into states. Shapiro and
similar right to travel cases reflect the history and structure of
Reconstruction.126 They identify the national norm of free
interstate passage, ingress, egress, migration, welfare, and fair
dealing. In Saenz v. Roe,127 the Court recognized the right to
travel as a feature of the Privileges or Immunities and Privileges

121. SIMMS, supra note 119, at 128; see FRANK U. QUILLIN, THE COLOR LINE
OHIO: A HISTORY OF RACE PREJUDICE IN A TYPICAL NORTHERN STATE 20–24,
38–40, 88 (1913).
122. SIMMS, supra note 119, at 128.
123. See 2 HURD, supra note 119, at 136 (explaining that after facing this
initial punishment, the free Black person must remove themselves from the
state or continue to face fines or forced labor).
124. See ALLAN NEVINS, ORDEAL OF THE UNION, SELECTED CHAPTERS 39
(1973); N. DWIGHT HARRIS, THE HISTORY OF NEGRO SERVITUDE IN ILLINOIS AND
OF THE SLAVERY AGITATION IN THAT STATE, 1719–1864, at 235–36, 239 (1904).
125. See 2 HURD, supra note 119, at 136 (citing an 1853 Indiana law which
made it a “[m]isdemeanor for negro or mulatto, bond or free, to come [to the
state] with intention of residing,” and that such individual may be “prosecuted
and fined or sold, for time, for fine and cost”); NEVINS, supra note 124, at 39.
126. See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489 (1999); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
127. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
IN
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and Immunities Clauses.128 In future cases the Court should
more clearly detail the historical basis of fundamental rights,
such as travel.
2.

Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause added norms into
constitutional structure that the Court has effectively adopted
into doctrine. The history of the Clause speaks to significant
constitutional change, including judicial review to enforce
norms of fairness its brief text implies. The second founders did
not fathom its breadth of applications from race, to sexual
orientation, and handicap status.
Nevertheless, the historical record evinces some, albeit
limited, understanding of the Equal Rights Clause’s breadth of
application. Even congressional opponents of the Clause, such
as Representative Samuel Randall, conceived the extent to
which the Fourteenth Amendment portended change to the
Constitution: “The first section proposes to make an equality in
every respect between the two races, notwithstanding the policy
of discrimination which has hitherto been exclusively exercised
by the States.”129 The power to enjoin inequality applied to all
three branches. It expanded legislative authority to pass
statutes, the executive’s to regulate, and the judiciary’s to
review. Judicial review became crucial for identifying
discriminatory actions and for fashioning equitable remedies.
Enforcement powers have evolved but remain grounded in the
nation’s founding norm in the Declaration of Independence “that
all men are created equal.”130 Following Reconstruction, the
Declaration’s statements about human rights, equality, and
self-government establish, what Senator Charles Sumner
called, a “sovereign rule of interpretation.”131
Structural changes lay dormant until the Supreme Court,
in Brown v. Board of Education, expanded the interpretive
128. See id. at 500–03 (discussing three types of the right to travel in the
contexts of both the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Privileges or
Immunities Clauses).
129. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2530 (1866).
130. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
131. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 828 (1872).
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value of the Equal Protection Clause.132 Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes infamously called that portion of the Constitution, “the
usual last resort of constitutional arguments.”133 The fault lay
in the Court itself for so diminishing the value of the Equal
Protection Clause in earlier cases such as Slaughter-House134
and the Civil Rights Cases.135 Holmes failed to recognize that
the Equal Protection Clause was part of this broader effort,
linked to emancipation and abolitionism before it, which pushed
to constitutionalize equal status under law. Anti-slavery
movements had moved for radical change to constitutional
order—the elimination of slavery—while searching for change
consistent with the Declaration of Independence. Those
principles foreshadowed the civil rights movement’s reliance on
the Court by organizations like the NAACP.136 Charles Sumner
in the late 1840s had argued that separate but unequal
education is stigmatic.137 Chief Justice Warren adopted a
similarly normative concept into his finding that segregated
schools violate equal protection and communicated a “sense of
inferiority [that] affects the motivation of a child to learn.”138
In Warren’s hands in Brown, the Clause was recognized for
its normative statement. Its integration of equality into doctrine
led to desegregation throughout society.139 He explained the
132. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits segregation
in public schools).
133. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). In the case, Holmes’s refusal
to recognize Carrie Buck’s Equal Protection claim led to one of the most
distasteful holdings in the history of the Supreme Court. See id. at 207
(asserting that state sterilization did not violate a woman’s rights because
“three generations of imbeciles are enough”).
134. See 83 U.S. 36, 81–82 (1872) (construing the Equal Protection Clause
to not apply to any actions outside of direct discrimination by a State against
Black individuals as a class).
135. See infra Part III.B.
136. See ALEXANDER TSESIS, WE SHALL OVERCOME: A HISTORY OF CIVIL
RIGHTS AND THE LAW 202–05 (2008) [hereinafter WE SHALL OVERCOME].
137. See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 203 (1849).
138. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
139. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 61–62 (1963) (per curiam)
(relying on Brown to find that the segregation of public facilities, such as
courtrooms, is constitutionally impermissible); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369
U.S. 350, 351, 353 (1962) (per curiam) (holding that public segregation in
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point in a speech, which identified how he regarded the
integration of principle, history, and structure:
What is the American ideal? It is simply and precisely stated
thusly in the Declaration of Independence—”We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness. []” . . . This noble language, fortified by the
implementing language of the 14th Amendment, makes the
picture complete.140

For him an aspiration had been made substantive by the
Reconstruction.
It is also no wonder that recent cases interweave equality
and autonomy interests. For example, in Obergefell Justice
Kennedy engaged in a sophisticated explanation, writing that
the right to raise a family safeguards self-definition and
fairness.141 The interweaving of freedom and equality in the case
is consistent with the historical record. As Kenneth Karst points
out,
[t]here was no serious effort to differentiate the functions of
the various clauses—privileges and immunities, due process,
equal protection—of section 1 of the proposed amendment.
With or without the privileges and immunities clause, the
section in its entirety was taken to guarantee equality in the
enjoyment of the rights of citizenship.142

airport dining facilities violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Holmes v. City
of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93, 94–95 (5th Cir. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(per curiam) (vacating a decision that had declared the segregation of public
golf courses to be constitutional); Dawson v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.
City, 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir. 1955), aff’d, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam)
(finding that racial segregation of public beaches and bathhouses was not
constitutionally permissible); Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204, 205–06 (E.D.
La. 1963), aff’d, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (per curiam) (granting injunctive relief for
the desegregation of a city auditorium).
140. Civil Rights & the Warren Court, EBONY, Feb. 1, 1970, at 28.
141. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 673–75, 681 (2015) (“These
considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental
right inherent in the liberty of the person.”).
142. Kenneth L. Karst, Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1977).
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The idea of the Equal Protection Clause, and the rest of the
Fourteenth Amendment, was to make citizenship a matter of
entitlements and guaranteed rights of free people. The newly
acquired power provided for judicial review, just as it did for
legislative enforcement, sufficient to address various
infringements on individuals’ rights.
3.

Political Processes

The ability of the Court to secure fundamental rights,
equality, and the franchise demonstrate that Professors
Tushnet and Waldron overplay their hands in arguing that the
judiciary is undemocratic.143 We have already seen that the
Supreme Court has advanced principles of democracy as to
fundamental rights and equality.144 So too with voting. The
Fifteenth Amendment dramatically altered the structure of
American government. History helps to understand this as do
the norms behind its ratification.
Ratification occurred in a country riddled with voting
inequality. A national solution was necessary. The Court has
relied on reconstruction powers to protect democratic
participation. The point could be illustrated by a whole group of
cases. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,145 for
instance, ruled that voting rights are protected under the Equal
Protection Clause.146 The Court used heightened scrutiny to
recognize the “one person, one vote” principle even before
Congress had adopted the Voting Rights Act of 1965.147 Warren
thought Baker v. Carr148 was “the most vital decision” of his

143. See supra Part I.A.
144. See supra Part II.B.1–2.
145. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
146. See id. at 622 (striking down a New York law that only allowed
individuals to vote in school district elections if they owned “taxable real
property” in the district or were the parents of “children enrolled in the local
public schools”).
147. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of
political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”).
148. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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career.149 Justice Brennan wrote the opinion, holding for the
first time malapportionment justiciable.150 The Court followed
with Wesberry v. Sanders151 where the Court held population
disparities among districts “grossly discriminate[ ] against
voters.”152
Indeed in some areas, such as politically manipulative
gerrymandering, the Court might exert even greater democratic
oversight. Davis v. Bandemer153 first recognized political
gerrymandering to be justiciable and not a purely political
matter.154 Yet, a lack of judicial standards has plagued this area
of law. In Vieth v. Jubelirer,155 for example, five Justices found
no judicially manageable standard to evaluate the
constitutionality of a gerrymander.156 More to date, as we will
see in Part III.C.2, the Court in a 2019 case, Rucho v. Common
Cause,157 almost abrogated its power to protect against political
gerrymandering.158
III. JUDICIAL OVERREACH IN MATTERS OF CIVIL RIGHTS
Part II discussed several doctrinal realizations of
Reconstruction. There is reason, nevertheless, not to adopt the
strong judicial review found in Strauss and Dworkin.159 The
Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments
149. POLLY PRICE, JUDGE RICHARD S. ARNOLD 57 (2019).
150. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 237 (“We conclude that the complaint’s
allegations of a denial of equal protection present a justiciable constitutional
cause of action . . . . The right asserted is within the reach of judicial protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
151. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
152. Id. at 7–9; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560–61 (1964).
153. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
154. See id. at 143.
155. 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
156. See id. at 293; id. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
157. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
158. See id. at 2506–07 (“[T]he fact that such gerrymandering is
incompatible with democratic principles . . . does not mean that the solution
lies with the federal judiciary. We conclude that partisan gerrymandering
claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”
(internal quotations omitted)).
159. See supra Part I.B.
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empower Congress with discretionary power over civil rights
and civil liberties. Judicial veto over such reasonable policies
works against the written text, aspirations, ideals, principles of
justice, and equality concerns.
This Part of the Article scrutinizes legislative authority to
fulfill the aspirations of liberty, equality, and franchise through
reasonable legislation. Several cases recognize congressional
authority to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. The
enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments (§ 2 of
the Thirteenth, § 5 of the Fourteenth, and § 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendments, each granting enforcement powers) explicitly
augmented Congress’s powers to promulgate civil rights and
civil liberties legislation.160
Judicial deference is adhered to in the landmark Thirteenth
Amendment case, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer,161 which upheld a
law protecting property rights against private discrimination.162
The Court reviewed and upheld congressional use of the § 2
enforcement power.163 The opinion, drafted by Justice Stewart,
found a civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, to be “necessary and
proper” for preventing discrimination in real estate
transactions.164 The Court recognized that the text of the
Amendment explicitly gave Congress broad latitude to enact
laws against legislatively identified rights violations: “Surely
Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment
rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents
of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination
into effective legislation.”165 Stewart extensively surveyed
historical sources, finding evidence that the Thirteenth
Amendment extended congressional authority to protect

160. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id.
amend. XV, § 2.
161. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
162. Id. at 440–41.
163. Id. at 438–44.
164. See id. at 439 (ruling that the Enabling Clause “clothed ‘Congress
with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and
incidents of slavery in the United States’” (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 20 (1883))).
165. Id. at 440.

RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS

879

property rights.166 Then, the Court in Runyon v. McCrary167
further deferred to congressional authority to criminalize
private racial discrimination in contractual matters.168
For a time, the Court was likewise deferential about
Congress’s reliance on Fourteenth Amendment, § 5 authority.
Katzenbach v. Morgan169 found that “[b]y including § 5 the
draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision
applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad
powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause.”170 The
Amendment does not require congressional complacency;
nothing in the text, history, or structure of § 5 indicates that it
narrowed congressional powers to those first identified by the
Court. To the contrary, its wording indicates enhanced
legislative leadership in ethical efforts to advance liberty and
equality for all. The liberal Justice Brennan wrote in Morgan
that the Court is not exclusive in the expansion of rights.
Congress can rely on § 5 power to strengthen protections of
rights; to think otherwise would be to relegate the legislative
branch “to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state
laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge
unconstitutional.”171 “[B]y including § 5,” the Reconstruction
Congress “sought to grant to Congress . . . the same broad
powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause.”172 On
this there was conservative and liberal consensus; Justice
Brennan in Morgan and Justice Stewart in Jones identified the
enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments to be
grants of broad authority to advance policies for enacting civil
rights-related laws.173 Similarly, a separate lead opinion written
166. See id. at 423–28.
167. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
168. See id. at 163, 168–73 (finding that Congress had the authority to
prohibit private schools from excluding qualified children purely because they
are Black).
169. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
170. Id. at 650.
171. Id. at 648–49.
172. Id. at 650.
173. See id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819),
which established the current scope of Necessary and Proper Clause
authority).
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by Justice Black drew attention to the Fifteenth Amendment
grant of power to Congress: “[E]xemption from discrimination in
the exercise of the elective franchise.”174 Black, in Terry v.
Adams,175 found that the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth
Amendment granted a more robust “congressional power to
protect this new constitutional right” than even the rational
basis authority long related to the Necessary and Proper
Clause.176
Those cases bucked the more common pattern of judicial
supremacy, rooted in antebellum jurisprudence, which came at
the expense of congressional initiative, experimentation, and
representation.177 The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts chose
interpretive routes that denied the expansive reach of
Congress’s enforcement authority. In recent years, the Court
has thwarted legislative efforts to provide federal redress for
gender-motivated violence,178 to create monetary penalties for
states’ violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act179 and
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,180 and to reform
campaign finance laws.181 The Article now turns to cases that
limited congressional authority over fundamental rights and
liberties. While we previously saw that Professors Waldron’s
and Tushnet’s opposition to judicial review would stymie Court
efforts to advance constitutional reconstruction, this Part

174. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 467 (1953).
175. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
176. Id. at 468; see Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 294 (1999)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (writing of precedent that “compared Congress’
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power to its broad authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause”).
177. Repeated rejection of congressionally defined rights puts into doubt
Professor Barry Friedman’s claim that the Court tends to follow the popular
will. See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 2596, 2599 (2003) (“[O]ur system is one of popular constitutionalism, in
that judicial interpretations of the Constitution reflect popular will over
time.”).
178. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
179. See Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
180. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000).
181. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 319
(2010); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 227 (2014)
(plurality opinion).
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demonstrates that strong judicial review, of the type advocated
by Professors Strauss and Dworkin, would undermine
legislative enforcement of structural, historical, principled, and
textual aspects of constitutional reconstruction.
A.

Antebellum Misdirection

During the antebellum period, Dred Scott v. Sanford
protected the institution of chattel slavery against congressional
authority. It came to be the quintessential example of judicial
overreach into congressional prerogatives. Its outcome
illustrates why the Reconstruction Amendments were needed to
secure legislative enforcement in the aftermath of Civil War.
The case held unconstitutional the Missouri Compromise Act,
which had prohibited slavery from extending into northern
territory of the United States.182
Chief Justice Taney wrote the fractured opinion. Dred Scott
included six concurrences and two dissents. He infamously
wrote that persons of African heritage could never be U.S.
citizens and that the Declaration of Independence’s statement
of natural rights applied only to Whites.183 Taney furthermore
rejected the claim that Black slaves who had lived part of their
lives in free states, as had Dred Scott and his wife, Harriet, could
vindicate their freedom in federal courts.184
Taney’s belief that he could resolve from the bench the
sectional conflict over slavery proved gravely mistaken.185
Southern Congressmen relied on Taney’s lead opinion186 to rail
182. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857).
183. Id. at 407, 410.
184. Id. at 400.
185. See Earl M. Maltz, The Last Angry Man: Benjamin Robbins Curtis
and the Dred Scott Case, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 272 (2007); JAMES F. SIMON,
LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND THE PRESIDENT’S
WAR POWERS 127 (2006) (“[Taney] thought that he was performing a great
service for his country by eliminating the divisive issues of African-American
citizenship and the Missouri Compromise from the national debate. Like
President Buchanan, he hoped that the Court’s decision would silence
abolitionist agitation and preserve the Union.”).
186. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404, 426 (overturning the Missouri
Compromise and stating “[t]he Government of the United States had no right
to interfere for any other purpose but that of protecting the rights of the [slave]
owner”).
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against claims that Congress had sole administration over the
Missouri Territory.187 Rather than permanently resolving the
question of slavery, the Dred Scott opinion proved to be a
principal catalyst for civil war.
Without doing necessary historical research into the
subject, the Chief Justice claimed that neither the framers nor
the states had meant for Black inhabitants to be citizens.188
Writing in dissent, Justice Curtis exposed Taney’s misleading
fallacy: At the time of the founding, free Blacks had been
citizens of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New
Jersey, and North Carolina.189 African Americans also had
voting privileges in those states.190 Relying on this history,
Curtis argued that Blacks had then gained national citizenship
by virtue of their state citizenship.191 His view, however, did not
extend to persons of African descent who had throughout their
entire lives resided in slave states.
The Court proved a dangerous branch when its final
decision denied the universal enjoyment of rights. By the time
of Reconstruction, it was clear that Congress needed to be a
check against judicial error on matters of such gravity as liberty,
equality, and citizenship. Taney was wrong to claim that the
framers thought the Declaration of Independence did not apply
to persons of African descent.192 While that narrow-mindedness

187. See Anthony V. Baker, The Authors of All Our Troubles—The Press,
the Supreme Court, and the Civil War, 8 J.S. LEGAL HIST. 29, 57 (2000); Stuart
A. Streichler, Justice Curtis’s Dissent in the Dred Scott Case: An Interpretive
Study, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509, 539 (1997).
188. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411 (“Two clauses in the Constitution which
point directly and specifically to the negro race as a separate class of persons,
and show clearly that they were not regarded as a portion of the people or
citizens of the Government then formed.”).
189. Id. at 572–73 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 576.
192. Taney discounted the Declaration of Independence’s statement of
universal values. He wrote that if the framers had wanted to include Blacks
in the documents statement of national principles, then “the conduct of the
distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have
been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted.” Id.
at 410 (majority opinion).
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was certainly true of some of the documents’ signers, it certainly
was untrue of the Continental Congress as a whole.
Examination of revolutionary pamphlets, correspondences,
and news stories reveals a more nuanced record.193 An
influential American jurist wrote in 1778 that the rights people
“possess at birth are equal, and of the same kind.”194 John
Adams, a member of the committee of four assigned by the
Second Continental Congress to draft the Declaration, stated
that inalienable rights are divinely granted and they cannot be
“repealed or restrained by human laws” because they are
antecedent “to all earthly government.”195 Benjamin Franklin,
who was probably the best known of the Declaration’s signers,
went on to be President of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society.196
Furthermore, even the writings of Southern luminaries of the
caliber of George Mason and Patrick Henry evince realization
that their hypocritical retention of slaves violated the natural
law philosophy of the Revolution.197 In the North, emancipation
laws gave practical application to the Declaration’s statement of
193. For a discussion of how the Declaration of Independence’s recognition
of inalienable human rights informed the founding generation’s debates about
abolishing slavery, see TSESIS, supra note 33, at 65–74 (discussing
contemporaries who believed in Black innate inferiority). For representative
voices of that racist genre, see 2 EDWARD LONG, THE HISTORY OF JAMAICA OR,
GENERAL SURVEY OF THE ANTIENT AND MODERN STATE OF THAT ISLAND 353–73
(2d ed., Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1970) (1774) (taxonomizing Blacks somewhere
between humans and simians); see also JOHN DUNLAP, PERSONAL SLAVERY
ESTABLISHED, BY THE SUFFRAGES OF CUSTOM AND RIGHT REASON 18
(Philadelphia 1773).
194. Result of the Convention of Delegates Holden at Ipswich in the
County of Essex (1778), reprinted in THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF
THEOPHILUS PARSONS 359, 365 (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1861).
195. JOHN ADAMS, A DISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND FEUDAL LAW, in 3
THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 477, 480 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1851) (1782).
196. For a sophisticated and nuanced discussion of Franklin and U.S.
slavery, see DAVID WALDSTREICHER, RUNAWAY AMERICA: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN,
SLAVERY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 225 (1st ed. 2004).
197. Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants (Jan. 18, 1773), in
GEORGE S. BROOKES, FRIEND ANTHONY BENEZET 443–44 (1937) (“Would any one
believe that I am Master of Slaves of my own purchase! I am drawn along by
ye general Inconvenience of living without them; I will not, I cannot justify
it.”); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 370 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) (writing an indicting statement of Col. George Mason of his
own hypocrisy by stating that “every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant”).
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inalienable rights.198 Dred Scott contained a series of errors that
could only be rectified though constitutional change in favor of
congressional enforcement.
B.

Postbellum Reconstruction

Reconstruction was partly a response to Dred Scott, but, far
more so, it was an affirmation of federal interests in matters
involving liberty, equality, and voting. Ratification of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments augmented
congressional powers. Congress was given explicit, enumerated
powers to enforce principles of inalienable rights that from the
nation’s founding had been embedded in the Declaration of
Independence and Preamble to the Constitution.199 They altered
the structure of American governance by empowering Congress
to enforce laws that would prevent the Court from again
undercutting federal protections of rights.200
By adopting the Reconstruction Amendments, the nation
committed itself to throwing off the yoke of slavery and incidents
of bondage; securing due process, equal protection, the
privileges or immunities of citizenship; and advancing the
franchise. But by 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme
Court had overstepped its Article III bounds, donned the mantle
of interpretive supremacy, and effectively thwarted the
reconstruction of civil rights and civil liberties in the United
States.
The holding remains, never having been overturned, a
landmark for narrow reading of congressional enforcement
powers. The Civil Rights Cases curtailed congressional
authority even more forcefully than Dred Scott. The Court held

198. See WE SHALL OVERCOME, supra note 136, at 32.
199. Professor Charles Black pointed out that the Declaration of
Independence and the Preamble are “[t]he two best sources” for “striving
toward rational consistency, . . . keeping the rules of legal decision in tune
with the society’s structures and relationships, . . . [and] reaching toward
higher goals.” CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., ON READING AND USING THE NINTH
AMENDMENT, in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
EUGENE VICTOR ROSTOW 187, 192 (Myers S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman
eds., 1985).
200. See TSESIS, supra note 33, at 179–201.
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the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be unconstitutional.201 The full
name of the statute identified the breadth of its commitment to
racial justice: An Act To Protect All Citizens in Their Civil and
Legal Rights.202 The first section entitled “all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States” to “the full and equal
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters,
and other places of public amusement.”203 Other portions of the
law created civil and criminal penalties; it also granted
exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts.204 Congress had relied on
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers to
make a structural break from the antebellum model of
federalism, wherein states enjoyed exclusive control over
property and civil rights. Those two Amendments prohibited
state laws from interfering with the enjoyment of public places
of accommodation, irrespective of local and state prejudices.205
They were principled reforms that undertook to end the long
history of racial prejudice. Instead of recognizing them to be
augmentations of congressional powers, the Court narrowed the
Amendments’ significance, reach, and force. Thereby, the
majority rendered postbellum changes to the Constitution
almost dead letters.
The Civil Rights Cases thwarted radical constitutional
revision of federalism.206 Ordinary contract, property, criminal,
201. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
202. Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, §§ 1–4.
203. Id. § 1.
204. Id. §§ 2–3.
205. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce Fourteenth
Amendment Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 263 (2005)
[T]he framers of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . understood the
Fourteenth Amendment, at a minimum, as a delegation to Congress
of the plenary power to define and enforce in the federal courts the
substantive rights of U.S. citizens that they had just exercised in
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
206. Reconstruction had come to a near halt by the time the cases that
challenged the 1875 Act had reached the Justices. Parts of the South had
turned to new methods of oppression after the abolition of slavery. Citizenship
rights were curtailed through a mix of private customs that included the
sharecropping, segregation, peonage, and convict lease. JACQUELINE JONES,
THE DISPOSSESSED: AMERICA’S UNDERCLASSES FROM CIVIL WAR TO THE PRESENT
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and family matters remained within states’ general powers, but
such laws could no longer be used to prevent anyone from the
full and equal enjoyment of enumerated businesses.207 The
Court blew an indelible hole in the structure of constitutional
reconstruction. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
empowered Congress to pass civil rights legislation without
judicial interference. At a minimum, those two amendments
sought to prevent another national trauma brought on by Dred
Scott, in which the Supreme Court had cut the legs out from a
the Missouri Compromise of 1820.
Consolidated into the Civil Rights Cases were five separate
causes of action. Each contested various forms of segregation in
public accommodations, including access to a hotel and railroad
coach.208 The Court found the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be
facially unconstitutional. It held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not grant Congress the authority to pass a law
that regulated private conduct.209 The Court found the 1883 law
was not “corrective legislation.”210 Because the majority found it
was “primary and direct,” it held Congress had “superseded and
displaced state legislation.”211

107 (1992). See generally DAVID M. OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY (1996);
ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH (1996); KARIN A. SHAPIRO, A NEW SOUTH
REBELLION: THE BATTLE AGAINST CONVICT LABOR IN THE TENNESSEE COAL
FIELDS, 1871–1896 (1998).
207. See Civil Rights Act of 1875 § 1.
208. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 4–5. For more context see James
Madison, San Francisco Theatrical Memories, MUSEUM CITY S.F., https://
perma.cc/76GU-TC77 (concerning Maguire’s Opera House); Grand History: In
the Beginning, GRAND OSHKOSH, https://perma.cc/YEQ2-DRJB (detailing the
history of the Grand Opera House).
209. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (“It is State action of a
particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights
is not the subject-matter of the amendment.”).
210. Id. at 13.
211. Id. at 19 (“This is not corrective legislation; it is primary and direct;
it takes immediate and absolute possession of the subject of the right of
admission to inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement. It supersedes
and displaces state legislation on the same subject, or only allows it permissive
force.”). The state action doctrine, which prohibits Congress from relying on
the Fourteenth Amendment to directly regulate private conduct, eventually
prompted Congress to look to the Commerce Clause to pass civil rights laws
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The Court refused to defer to Congress’s five years’ worth of
investigations and hearings, which had illustrated the harms of
segregation and the need for federal remedies.212 Justice
Bradley, who wrote the majority opinion, also denied that
segregation and racial discrimination by businesses were
continued incidents of slavery.213
The lone dissent by Justice Harlan took the majority to
task, writing that federal legislation could regulate
discrimination by state-licensed companies.214 Harlan compared
the Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases with that of Dred
Scott because both so significantly encroached on congressional
powers. As Justice Harlan stated in dissent, the majority
prevented Congress from acting at “its own discretion, and
independently of the action or non-action of the states.”215
Harlan argued that businesses could be regulated by federal
civil rights legislation. That is, the Act controlled economic
intercourse, not private relations.
The law provided federal protections to advance the
reconstruction values of racial equality and meaningful liberty.
But the majority shifted away from the values of constitutional
change, foreclosing the nation’s ability to enforce civil
reconstruction. The Court had not only failed to advance the
changed Constitution, it prevented Congress from doing so. The
results of the opinion were entirely contrary to the abolitionist
vision from which those two amendments sprang.

and the Court to channel much of its civil rights decisions through the
Commerce Clause rather than the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments.
212. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 984–1092 (1995) (detailing congressional
debates preceding passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875).
213. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883).
214. See id. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce that
amendment, by appropriate legislation, may enact laws to protect
that people against the deprivation, because of their race, of any
civil rights granted to other freemen in the same State; and such
legislation may be of a direct and primary character, operating upon
States, their officers and agents, and also upon, at least, such
individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and wield
power and authority under the state.
215. Id. at 57.
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The eight-Justice majority did more than put a stop to
nationwide desegregation. It diminished congressional
authority despite the explicit grant of lawmaking powers in the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The history of
systemic national racism that led to ratification of liberty and
equality norms was ignored. Outcry about the Supreme Court’s
self-aggrandizing opinion was caustic. A newspaper columnist
wrote that after the holding in the Civil Rights Cases “it is safe
to say that no other decision of the court since the famous Dred
Scott decision . . . has created so much excitement and
discussion.”216 The analogy between the two cases was not lost
on other authors in the months after the 1883 decision.217
The Supreme Court had put a nail into the heart of
Reconstruction. And southern states were glad to take
advantage of the Court’s axe job to congressional power, tearing
the heart out of the constitutional reconstruction, finding
unconstitutional the crown jewel of Reconstruction. From there
the nation slid into further separation of the races. Less than
half a month after the Civil Rights Cases decision was
announced, the Governor of Texas asked rail companies to
separate Black and White passengers.218 The Supreme Court’s
effects on national reconstruction became evident almost
immediately. By 1891, various Jim Crow laws had been passed
in Florida (1887), Mississippi (1888), Texas (1889), Louisiana
(1890), Alabama (1891), Arkansas (1891), Kentucky (1891), and
Georgia (1891).219
Additional cases of the post-Reconstruction period also
relied on a strong judicial finality to undermine federal civil
rights. During that era, the Court positioned itself as a powerful
opponent to legislative authority. To thwart congressional
action, the Court became a bulwark for state power, which
deprived citizens of the ability to effectively petition
representatives to end racial discrimination.
216. THE STEVENS POINT JOURNAL (Stevens Point, WI), Oct. 27, 1883, at 2.
217. See, e.g., There Is No Reason To Doubt . . . , ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS
(Denver, Colorado), Oct. 21, 1883, at 2.
218. See Norman J. Colman, COLMAN’S RURAL WORLD, Nov. 1, 1883, at 4,
https://perma.cc/HJ2K-6ZGN (PDF).
219. C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877–1913, at
211– 12 (1951).
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United States v. Cruikshank220 involved an appeal from
three convictions under the First Enforcement Act of 1870,
popularly known as the Civil Rights Act of 1870 or the First Ku
Klux Klan Act.221 The Justice Department secured convictions
for terrorist acts perpetrated against Black protestors who had
gathered at a local courthouse to protest the outcome of a
municipal election.222 Seventy to 165 freemen and three White
men were murdered in the melee. The White militia set fire to
the courthouse and shot or captured protestors who fled the
conflagration. Many of those captured were marched away and
later executed.223
The Supreme Court overturned all three convictions,
holding no one accountable for the racial injustice.224 Chief
Justice Waite, writing for the majority, found the government’s
complaints to be deficient.225 While the Court recognized a
national right to peaceful assembly,226 it foreclosed reliance on
congressional policy to punish privately perpetrated racial
violence.227 The Court left enforcement of civil rights to the
220.
92 U.S. 542 (1876).
221. Id. at 43–44; see 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (“An Act to enforce the Right of
Citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union, and
for other Purposes.”); the small number was disappointing after the
government had secured nearly one hundred indictments. ROBERT J.
KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876, at 176–77
(1985).
222. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 43–44.
223. See JAMES K. HOGUE, UNCIVIL WAR: FIVE NEW ORLEANS STREET
BATTLES AND THE RISE AND FALL OF RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION 109–11 (2006);
LEEANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BLACK POWER,
WHITE TERROR AND THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION 109–10 (2008).
224. The jury had acquitted six other defendants. See James Gray Pope,
Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank (1876) Belongs at the
Heart of Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 385 (2014)
(“Cruikshank played a crucial role in terminating Reconstruction and
launching the one-party, segregationist regime of ‘Jim Crow’ that prevailed in
the South until the 1960s.”).
225. Despite the momentous nature of the case, Waite found that the
indictments were incomplete because they did not enumerate the civil rights
that the federal government sought to vindicate. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at
552–53.
226. See id. at 552–53.
227. See id. at 554
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exclusive control of states, which was meaningless where law
enforcement agents sometimes participated in vigilante violence
or refused to mobilize adequate police protections against racist
attackers.228 Judicial finality, in Cruikshank, amounted to the
further establishment of a states’ rights doctrine that prevented
federal authorities from quelling racially motivated violence. It
rejected a broad reading of the nation’s changed relationship
between the states and federal government, which had
expanded national standards for the enforcement of civil rights.
Other cases also weakened Congress’s Reconstruction
powers. The Court even undercut the legislature’s power to
safeguard voting in the federal elections. United States v.
Reese229 held that the Fifteenth Amendment does not secure the
right to vote,230 a decision with lasting repercussions.231 Reese
struck down a criminal federal statute that prohibited state
elections officials from denying the right to vote to eligible
persons.232

The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and
from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws; but it adds nothing to the rights of one citizen
as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty
against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental
rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society.
228. See id. at 553.
229. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
230. See id. at 217 (“The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of
suffrage upon any one. It prevents the States, or the United States, however,
from giving preference, in this particular, to one citizen of the United States
over another on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”).
231. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“The individual citizen has
no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the
United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide
election . . . .”); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (“Being
unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the United States does not
confer the right of suffrage upon any one . . . .”).
232. See 16 Stat. 140. While the majority in Reese claimed the statute was
not limited to the language of the Fifteenth Amendment—which prohibits
discrimination in franchise based on race, color, and prior condition of
servitude—the text of the statute explicitly states those three conditions. Id.
§§ 1, 2 (“[All persons eligible] shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such
elections, without distinction of race, color or previous condition of
servitude . . . .”).

RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS

891

A final example will demonstrate how inimical the
postbellum Supreme Court was in jettisoning federal civil rights
initiatives. As with the other cases in this section, it
demonstrates why congressional oversight is necessary to
prevent Justices from undermining legislative efforts to advance
the general welfare. United States v. Harris233 held Congress
had exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment § 5 authority by
passing a section of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 that was
“directed exclusively against the action of private persons,
without reference to the laws of the State or their
administration by her officers,” and therefore “not warranted by
any clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.”234 In consequence, Congress was left to regulating
only direct actions by government officials, their policies, or
some law.235 Here too, as Jack Balkin has pointed out, the Court
prevents Congress from identifying what private acts have a
close enough nexus to state action—such as government
contracting and transportation companies—to warrant
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement.236 The power to pass
federal law recognizing civil violations was upended.
C.

Rehnquist & Roberts Courts’ Restraints on Legislative
Powers
1.

Rehnquist Court

Several Rehnquist Court precedents further imbedded the
strong version of judicial finality. We have already seen that
part of this must be attributed to an absolute reading of Cooper
v. Aaron.237 Professor Alexander Bickel hyperbolically critiqued
233. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
234. Id. at 640.
235. See id. at 643.
236. See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1801, 1856–60 (2010).
237. For a discussion on Cooper, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
See also Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A
Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 163 (1997) (“Justice
Kennedy’s opinion adopted a startlingly strong view of judicial
supremacy. . . . Boerne . . . adopted the most judge-centered view of
constitutional law since Cooper v. Aaron.”).
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the holding: “Whatever the Court lays down is right, even if
wrong, because the Court and only the Court speaks in the name
of the Constitution.”238 Professor Gerald Gunther (albeit with
less sarcasm) also asserted that the Court in Cooper mistook
“Marshall’s assertion [in Marbury] of judicial authority to
interpret the Constitution with judicial exclusiveness.”239 The
Rehnquist Court redefined Cooper, a case meant to assert
judicial power to protect civil rights against states’
recalcitrance, into precedent for diminishing congressional
reconstruction authority in City of Boerne v. Flores.
The holding and reasoning of Boerne demonstrate how the
modern Court augmented its power as sole interpreter of the
reconstructed Constitution. It relegated Congress to a reactive
role, a sort of small brother rather than a coequal branch of
government.240 This violated simple checks and balances as the
enforcement powers of the Fourteenth Amendment granted to
national legislators. The Boerne majority found that even when
Congress acted pursuant to an enumerated constitutional right,
free exercise of religion in the First Amendment, it overstepped
its enforcement power.241 This makes it much more difficult
than Katzenbach v. Morgan had envisioned for Congress to
identify rational means to achieve textually grounded
constitutional objectives.242 The majority, drafted by Justice
Kennedy, held that a significant portion of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was unconstitutional because
it was “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive
object that it [could not] be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”243

238. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 264 (1962).
239. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 25 n.155 (1964).
240. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (stating that
Congress has no power to interpret its enforcement authority, provided under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
241. See id.
242. For a study of core constitutional principles see generally ALEXANDER
TSESIS, CONSTITUTIONAL ETHOS (Oxford Univ. Press 2017).
243. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
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Boerne relied on the holdings in the Civil Rights Cases and
United States v. Harris (not bothering to mention how those
cases helped to drive a stake into the civil rights movement of
the late-nineteenth century) for the postulate that Congress is
limited to remedying past patterns of state discrimination.244
Kennedy found lawmakers have no independent authority for
enforcing fundamental rights.245 Just as in the late nineteenth
century, the Court augmented its interpretive power to the
detriment of Congress’s enforcement of religious liberties
against state encroachments. Professor Jack Balkin notes that
the Court lacked any structural, textual, or historical reasons to
thereby limit Congress’s § 5 enforcement power.246
As things stand, the Supreme Court continues interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment as a restraint rather than a broad
grant of congressional powers sufficient to prevent judicial
overreach of the type quintessentially evident in Dred Scott.
Congress passed the RFRA to expand the fundamental
right to exercise religion, which is guaranteed under the First
Amendment.247 The statute required courts to rely on strict
judicial scrutiny in reviewing alleged burdens on the exercise of
religious freedoms. That standard of review sought to displace
the Court’s use of rational basis scrutiny to review laws of
general applicability that had only an incidental effect on
religious worship.248 Boerne denied Congress the ability to act
on its initiative, relegating the nation’s lawmakers to a remedial
role rather than treating them as members of a coequal branch
244. See id. at 532.
245. See id. at 520 (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s history confirms the
remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause.”); id. at
524 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)); id. at 525 (relying on
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883)).
246. See Balkin, supra note 236, at 1815.
247. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (“Legislation which alters the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause.”).
248. Congress had sought to overturn a previous Supreme Court case,
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and to reinstate the strict
scrutiny test from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See H.R. Rep. No.
103-88, at 14 (1993) (recommending the passage of RFRA to reinstate strict
scrutiny in freedom of religion cases); S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 12–13 (1993)
(same).
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of government. This Rehnquist Court holding only recognized
lawmakers’ Fourteenth Amendment powers to make laws
responsive to the Court’s prior interpretations.249 In the words
of the Court, Congress has no mandate “to decree the substance
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”250
This effectively disarmed Congress from being able to pass
initiatives more protective of religious liberty than the Court
had previously identified. As Professor Michael McConnell
points out, Congress was not trying to define its own powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather it sought to correct
what it regarded to be the Court’s mistaken interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause.251
The Court expanded its judicial finality rationale, striking
down bipartisan civil rights legislation.252 In Boerne, the Court
reinforced its claim to be the only branch of government able to
identify the scope of constitutional reconstruction, this despite
the Fourteenth Amendment § 5’s explicit grant of enforcement
power to the national legislature rather than the judiciary. The
holding intruded into Congress’s ability to pass uniform laws
narrowly tailored to safeguard religious liberties. In effect, the
unelected branch devalued the fundamental liberty of religion
in favor of a judicially contrived test. In the name of preserving
the Constitution, the Court abridged authority that the text of
the Fourteenth Amendment granted to legislators.
Boerne returned to the post-Reconstruction understanding
of legislative authority and away from the Warren Court’s more
deferential approach to congressional civil rights and civil
liberties initiatives. The Court abandoned recognition of
congressional authority to advance but not curtail rights. The
majority explicitly denied its Civil Rights Era conclusion in
Morgan that “§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is a positive
grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its
249. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524–25, 536.
250. Id. at 519.
251. See McConnell, supra note 237, at 173.
252. The statute was sponsored by Senators Kennedy and Hatch and
passed in the Senate on a vote of 97–3 and in the House by unanimous voice
vote. William L. Saunders et al., Religious Liberty After Hobby Lobby: A Panel
of the 2014 Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention, 48 CONN. L. REV.
969, 974 (2016).
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discretion in determining whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”253 In Boerne, to the contrary, the Court construed
§ 5 as a narrow grant of legislative authority, while asserting
broad judicial powers.254
The Court’s reasoning took a constitutional provision,
containing a legislative enforcement provision and designed to
prevent overreaching similarly disastrous as Dred Scott, and
found it inadequate to secure religious liberty, guaranteed by
the First Amendment and incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Boerne doctrine of exclusivity in interpretation and
congressional remediation under § 5 hampers congressional
initiatives on how and when it should exercise its Fourteenth
Amendment authority. In effect, short of resorting to Article V
mechanisms for amending the Constitution, judicial exclusivity
in interpretation stripped the enforcement mechanism built into
the Fourteenth Amendment to advance equal protection of
individual rights and ability to advance the general welfare.255
Section 5, which authorizes Congress to enforce the Due Process
Clause over matters like the free exercise of religion, was
stripped down by a judicial power grab.256 The Court is certainly
responsible for interpreting the Constitution in toto, including
substantive due process, equal protection, and citizenship in the
Fourteenth Amendment. But § 5 is also a clear grant of

253. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
254. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997).
255. See Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitutionalism: Liberal Equality for
the Common Good, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1613 (2013).
256. See Robin West, Constitutional Culture or Ordinary Politics: A Reply
to Reva Siegel, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1478 n.40 (2006) (asserting that “the U.S.
Congress has an obligation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment”
to ensure states uphold the “duty to protect all citizens’ natural rights”); cf.
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment
Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 187, 263 (2005)
[T]he framers of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . understood the
Fourteenth Amendment, at a minimum, as a delegation to Congress
of the plenary power to define and enforce in the federal courts the
substantive rights of U.S. citizens that they had just exercised in
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
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increased authority to Congress to pass federal civil rights laws
without judicial interference. Rather than follow constitutional
text, the Boerne Court also created a loosely defined congruence
and proportionality test, granting itself final power to review
policy decisions better left to political rather than judicial fact
gathering.257
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause
logically goes to the core function of representative governance.
The Second Founding elevated the people’s ability to petition
their elected officials to define rights intrinsic to liberty, equality
and citizenship.
The Constitution nowhere gives the judiciary exclusive
authority to define the full range of federal civil rights, such as
free exercise of religion, nor does it reserve that authority for
unelected judges. The judiciary’s role in preventing majorities
from undermining minorities’ constitutional interests is not
implicated where Congress passes safeguards of essential
interests in matters such as worship.
The Court further eroded legislative, Reconstruction
authority in United States v. Morrison, where it struck down the
civil remedy provided by the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA).258 The punishments provided under the federal law did
not limit state criminal enforcement, but created federal, civil

257. See F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of
Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1487 (2010)
Under the current regime, the courts have control over the scope of
their power and the power of the legislature. The Court has
exercised that power in controversial ways. For example, in City of
Boerne the Court limited Congress’s power to enforce the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that the Court,
not Congress, has the power to determine the scope of rights
protected by the Amendment.
William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 87, 97 n.27 (2001)
[W]hile the existence of judicial review has been well established
since . . . the task of assessing societal conditions and determining
policy responses, particularly where the Constitution allocates
lawmaking power to Congress to regulate commerce or implement
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, has been allocated not
to the courts, but to Congress.
258. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617, 627 (2000).

RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS

897

cause of action for gender-motivated crimes.259 As it had in
Boerne, the majority in Morrison adopted and gave a
contemporary gloss to the state action doctrine that was a
deciding factor in the Civil Rights Cases, Cruikshank, and
Harris.260 Those cases had undermined congressional authority
in the post-Reconstruction terms, and the Court relied on them
as precedents in Morrison.261 The majority found the private
remedy to be unconstitutional because it targeted private rather
than state action.262 Morrison is yet another example of the state
action doctrine, a contrivance of the Court’s interpretation,
relied on to thwart congressional reliance on its enforcement
power.
Congress had relied on two enumerated powers to pass the
law; here I’m only dealing with the use of Fourteenth
Amendment § 5 authority, not the Commerce Clause.263 The
case followed Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test to
deny the operation of VAWA, which had been passed by
bipartisan congressional majorities.264 The Act created a private
federal cause of action for the victims of sexual and domestic
violence.265 Morrison further augmented judicial power at the
expense of the legislature by prohibiting Congress to identify
substantive rights, allowing it only to remedy wrongs that the
Court had previously defined.266 The Court left ambiguous how
broadly civil rights violations must occur in states before
259. See id. at 605–06.
260. See id. at 621 (“Foremost among these limitations is the time-honored
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only
state action.”).
261. Id. at 621–23.
262. Id. at 621.
263. Id. at 627 (“Congress’s effort in § 13981 to provide a federal civil
remedy can be sustained neither under the Commerce Clause nor under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
264. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
265. The majority in Morrison continued to limit Congress’s § 5 power to
the enactment of laws congruent and proportional between the means chosen
and the policy end to be achieved. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625–26 (citing Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
639 (1999)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997).
266. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625–26 (stating that Congress’s power is
limited to prophylactic legislation).
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Congress can pass congruent and proportional laws against
them.
Without being able to act directly against a select group of
bad state actors, Morrison severely hampered Congress’s ability
to pass laws for the general welfare under § 5. Prior to passing
VAWA, Congress created a massive legislative record, which
established the importance of a national solution to many
instances of states’ inadequate responses to gender-based
violence.267 The collected “mountain of data” included findings
of twenty-one state task forces and nine congressional
hearings.268 But even that did not convince the Court of the
commensurability between the federal remedy and the finding
that states regularly failed to adequately prosecute sexual
violence.
Moreover, VAWA enjoyed federal and state support,
showing the extent to which it was well within the bounds of
social morality as it has developed in the aftermath of
Reconstruction.269 The majority’s expression of interpretive
exclusivity discounted congressional policy and outright rejected
benign congressional reasoning.
Additional Rehnquist Court decisions further expanded the
scope of judicial authority to thwart congressional reliance on
beyond constitutionally reasonable grounds. Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents270 held that state sovereign immunity
prohibited Congress from relying on its § 5 authority to create a
remedy for state employees to sue for monetary damages under

267. See id. at 653–54 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining the array of
states’ executive and legislative branch entities that support the passage of
VAWA).
268. Id. at 628–31.
269. That social morality against gender discrimination is evident from the
development of Equal Protection cases. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 558 (1996) (holding Virginia Military Institute’s categorical refusal to
accept female applicants unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (striking down Oklahoma law on
equal protection grounds for arbitrarily differentiating between males and
females); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (ruling that law
distinguishing between male and female administrators of estates violated
Equal Protection Clause).
270. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).

RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS

899

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).271 The
majority relied on a doctrine of sovereign immunity, which it
revived through the Eleventh Amendment, to thwart Congress’s
rational use of Reconstruction power for the benefit of elderly
Americans.272 A law based on the conscience of the nation
toward its older citizens became largely ineffective because of
judicial veto. The Court simply interpreted the doctrine of
sovereign immunity to expand state rights and judicial,
interpretive prerogatives. Given its self-proclaimed interpretive
supremacy, the Court rendered an interpretation that
effectively superseded the people’s sovereign right, through
their representatives, to pass effective civil rights legislation.273
The Court likewise denied Congress the right to rely on its
power to abide by national norms for the treatment of the
disabled in University of Alabama v. Garrett,274 where it found
unconstitutional a key provision of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).275 There too, as in Boerne and Kimel, the
Court stifled congressional use of Fourteenth Amendment
authority.276 Thereby, the Court weakened a law of such
consequence that President George H. W. Bush likened it to the
Declaration of Independence.277
271. See id. at 82–83 (“Applying the same ‘congruence and proportionality’
test in these cases, we conclude that the ADEA is not ‘appropriate legislation’
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); id.at 91.
272. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 183–84 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that while “[t]he Hans doctrine was
erroneous . . . it has not previously proven to be unworkable or to conflict with
later doctrine” and hence is a part of stare decisis, but arguing that where
Congress clearly abrogated that sovereign immunity, as it did with the ADEA,
the restriction against federal courts hearing private suits does not govern);
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1890) (holding that states are immune
from federal suits brought by private parties who are citizens of that state); cf.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 733 (1999) (“Although the sovereign immunity
of the States derives at least in part from the common-law tradition, the
structure and history of the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists
today by constitutional design.”).
273. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 92.
274. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
275. See id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 374–75.
277. Presidential Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1166 (July 26, 1990).
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2.

Roberts Court

The Roberts Court has continued to expand the judicial grip
on interpretive exclusivity. In the area of free speech, for
instance, the lack of deference is reminiscent of Lochner era
overreach.278 The Court has also struck state consumer- and
health-related regulations with little explanation for
superseding federalist principles.279 This Part of the Article
focuses only on congressional power over racial voting
discrimination; and in this area, the Court has also continued to
bevel away at congressional powers provided by the
Reconstruction Amendments.
In Shelby County v. Holder, a majority turned back one of
Congress’s efforts to rely on Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
power to regulate state and local jurisdictions with histories of
racial discrimination.280 The Court held that the 2006 coverage
formula, found in § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), was
unconstitutional because it identified and listed covered states
based on data the majority found to be outdated.281 Following
the decision, formerly designated voting districts can change
voting laws without prior notice to the U.S. Attorney General.
After Shelby, § 2 of the VRA continues to permit individual
litigants to file suits challenging race-based restrictions on

278. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change, 107 HARV. L. REV.
30, 109–16 (1993). For arguments that protection of commercial speech
revivified Lochner-era intrusions into legislative economic prerogatives see
Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 8, 40 (1979).
279. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 558–59, 565 (2011)
(striking as unconstitutional a Vermont state law protecting health-related
privacy); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 496–97 (2014) (finding a law
protecting women’s access to reproductive services to be unconstitutional).
280. 570 U.S. 529, 556 (2013) (“[I]t would have been irrational to base
coverage on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when such tests have been
illegal since that time. But that is exactly what Congress has done.”).
281. See id. at 557 (“Congress could have updated the coverage formula at
that time, but did not do so. Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice
but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional.”).
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voting.282 Such private § 2 litigation, however, is more difficult
to pursue because it is highly costly and time-consuming.283
The states, municipalities, and counties covered by the
§ 4(b) formula had been required to obtain preclear permission
from the federal government before altering their political
districts.284 Congress had created a list based on their ongoing
histories of voter discrimination.285 “Congress knew that some
of the States . . . had resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of
contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of
perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal
court decrees.”286 Nevertheless, the Court held that the 2006
re-authorization of the statute failed to account for listed
jurisdictions’ made strides at ending voter discrimination.287
Such drafting imprecision the majority regarded to be
congressional overreach that violated the “fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty” among the states.288
The dissent to Shelby County pointed out that the majority
misstated the record. As Justice Ginsburg demonstrated,
Congress had collected extensive evidence to re-pass the 2006
preclearance requirement.289 She pointed out that legislative

282. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)–(b).
283. See NAACP Legal Def. Fund, THE COST (IN TIME, MONEY, AND
BURDEN) OF SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT LITIGATION, https://perma.cc
/4U34-VA2Y (PDF) (“A huge amount of resources is needed to bring a Section
2 complaint.”); Hearing Before Subcomm. on the Const., 109th Cong. 65 (2006),
https://perma.cc/2N6Q-QYYD (“I would estimate that the cost of a vote
dilution case . . . runs close to half a million dollars in costs.”); Hearing Before
Subcomm. on the Const., 109th Cong. 73 (2005), https://perma.cc/2YW3-Z9B6
(“A full section 2 case litigated just through the end of trial is at least 2 years.
You can’t do it any faster than that. There are always the outlyers [sic], the
15-year cases. But 2 to 5 years is a rough average.”).
284. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 534 (“[Section] 4 of the Act applied
that requirement only to some States—an equally dramatic departure from
the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty.”).
285. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 §§ 3(c), 4(b).
286. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966).
287. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 547.
288. Id. at 544.
289. See id. at 564–65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As the 1982
reauthorization approached its 2007 expiration date, Congress again
considered whether the VRA’s preclearance mechanism remained an
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policy had been made before the backdrop of hearings that the
Senate had conducted in April, June, and July 2006. Thereafter,
the bill was debated on the floor of the House, where “extensive
hearings” had also been conducted.290 The findings were,
moreover, consistent with holdings of liability for violating
minority voters’ rights in decisions rendered by courts in covered
jurisdictions.291
By relying on its Fifteenth Amendment power, Congress
had unambiguously enforced the American people’s will to
safeguard voting equality by reauthorizing § 4(b) of the Voting
Rights Act (VRA) in 2006. The House voted for it by a huge
margin, 390 yeas to 33 nays, and the Senate voted 98–0 in
favor.292 In this age of political gridlock, such bipartisan
consensus is rare. It demonstrates the civic possibilities of
constitutional
reconstruction
with
increased
federal
enforcement authority. But the Court relied on judicial
exclusivity to intrude against express enforcement power
granted to Congress by the Fifteenth Amendment for ending
racial barriers to voting.293
The judicial doctrine of equal state sovereignty for the
Court in Shelby County displaced explicit § 2 power for Congress
to identify and implement the means for ending certain voting
rights violations. This holding was counter to the Fifteenth
Amendment’s alteration to the structure of constitutional
government. It granted to national lawmakers the ability to
pass legislation rationally designed to end enumerated forms of

appropriate response to the problem of voting discrimination in covered
jurisdictions.”).
290. Id.
291. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920–22 (1995); Hunter v.
Underwood, 730 F.2d 614, 617 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 471 U.S. 222 (1985);
Brown v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs., 706 F. 2d 1103, 1107 (11th Cir. 1983); Common
Cause v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2005); Dillard v. City
of Foley, 926 F. Supp. 1053, 1067 (M.D. Ala. 1995). For a fuller list of cases see
152 CONG. REC. S7954 (July 20, 2006).
292. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 565 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
293. See id. at 556 (majority opinion) (“It would have been irrational for
Congress to distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on
40-year-old data, when today’s statistics tell an entirely different story.”).
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voting discrimination.294 Its provisions granted Congress power
to enforce laws against any state or locality that continues to
deny the franchise to persons based on race. The text granted
Congress the power to make racially conscious policies likely to
rectify and remedy civic inequalities. As Chief Justice Warren
articulated it, the Fifteenth Amendment principle is: “As
against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any
rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of
racial discrimination in voting.”295 It is this principle that Shelby
County abrogated.
The Fifteenth Amendment addition to the Constitution was
consistent with another Reconstruction-era guarantee of “fair
and effective representation for all citizens.”296 While the final
Reconstruction Amendment did not guarantee a general right to
vote,297 it empowered Congress to prevent states from denying
political representation based on racially invidious
qualifications. The risk that Congress will intrude into
traditional areas of federalism are alleviated because of the
Amendment’s exacting language.298 The VRA’s preclearance
294. As ratified, the Fifteenth Amendment proved inadequate to end many
types of states’ interferences with voting. Senators Oliver Morton, Willard
Warner, and Henry Wilson decried the failure to grant Congress the power to
prevent states from deploying literacy, property, and educational
qualifications to disfranchise Blacks. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong. 861–62 (1869)
(Warner); id. at 863 (Morton); id. at 1626–27 (Wilson). Moreover, feminists,
especially Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, decried the
Fifteenth Amendment’s failure to secure women the vote. ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION 447 (1988).
295. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966).
296. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (stated in the context of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
297. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“The individual citizen has
no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the
United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide
election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the
electoral college.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 101
(1973) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he right to vote in state elections has itself
never been accorded the statute of an independent constitutional guarantee.”).
298. See Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on
Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1190–91 (2001) (“Section 2 [of the
Fifteenth Amendment] could not possibly give rise to a legitimate fear that, if
construed to require only McCulloch-style means-ends tailoring, it would
functionally award Congress a virtually plenary police power.”).
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requirement was consistent with the normative and structural
changes to the Constitution that came in after a bloody civil war.
The Fifteenth Amendment, as the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments before it, changed the federalist
structure in favor of legislative authority to pass national laws
safeguarding civil rights and civil liberties. At a minimum the
Enforcement Clauses were drafted to give Congress power to act
against state racial discrimination.299 Section 4(b) of the VRA
served just that rational function.300 Review of the preclearance
requirement should have received deferential review from the
Court of the congressional enforcement of a law whose scope was
limited to voting discriminations based on racial, color, and
previous conditions status. Congress adhered to the
Amendment’s textual restraints on its power to abide by the
democratic principle of minority voting. Ginsburg pointed out
that “Congress approached the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA
with great care and seriousness,” in light of continuing voter
discriminations in the State of Alabama, including in Shelby
County.301 But the Shelby County majority depreciated and
diminished congressional enforcement authority.
The decision came at a time when Americans, especially
those living in Black and Latino neighborhoods, have found it
more difficult to locate a polling place to cast their ballots.
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights reports that
between 2012 and 2018 almost 1,700 polling stations were
closed in states that had followed pre-clearance requirements.302

299. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325–36 (“[Section] 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment expressly declares that ‘Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.’ By adding this authorization, the Framers
indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the
rights created in § 1.”).
300. Frankly, strong arguments can be made for the most exacting
scrutiny: that § 4(b) was a necessary means for government to achieve the
compelling interest of preventing racial discrimination in the franchise. But
more work would be needed to prove up that point than the rational scrutiny
method in support of which this Article argues.
301. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 581 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
302. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUCATION FUND, DEMOCRACY
DIVERTED: POLLING PLACE CLOSURE AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE, https://perma.cc
/24NA-9HSW (PDF).
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Three battleground states of the 2020 election—Texas, Arizona,
and Georgia—experienced the greatest number of closures.303
In a case challenging two states’ gerrymandering schemes,
Rucho v. Common Cause, the Court refused to even adjudicate
to advance political equality in voting.304 Voters brought suits in
North Carolina and Maryland, claiming that their states’
congressional districts were politically gerrymandered to dilute
votes of the minority political party in both states.305 The
majority refused to rule in favor of a First Amendment and
Equal Protection challenge to two highly partisan voting district
plans, one fashioned by a state’s Democratic majority and the
other by a different state’s Republican majority.306 The Supreme
Court refused to review partisan gerrymandering for lack of a
judicially manageable standard.307
The Court held the matter was non-justiciable.308 Among
the findings, wrote Chief Justice Roberts, the Guarantee Clause
does not provide a cognizable claim in this matter.309 Justice
Kagan asserted in dissent that the majority was “throwing up
its hands” without providing direction.310
The doctrine of equal voting rights might have given the
Rucho Court a starting point to draft a clearly articulated test
for fairly designing voting districts. Indeed, the lower court had
found that the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment,
303. See A House Divided, ECONOMIST (Sept. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc
/QJ83-WRDJ.
304. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019) (“Excessive partisanship in districting
leads to results that reasonably seem unjust. But the fact that such
gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with democratic principles,’ does not mean
that the solution lies with the federal judiciary.” (citation omitted)).
305. Id. at 2491.
306. Id. at 2506–07.
307. See id. at 2494, 2508 (finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction for
lack of limits on a case and controversy capable of resolution through judicial
process).
308. Id.
309. See id. at 2506; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. For an elaboration on
Guarantee Clause relevance to gerrymandering review see generally David S.
Louk, Reconstructing the Congressional Guarantee of Republican Government,
73 VAND. L. REV. 673 (2020).
310. Lower federal courts had “largely converged on a standard for
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims.” Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2516
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
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and the Elections Clause are relevant to the adjudication of
partisan gerrymandering claims.311 The majority in Rucho,
however, held that the First Amendment does not supply “a
serious standard for separating constitutional from
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.”312 The same claim
of ambiguity might be leveled at every free speech issue resolved
under the the First Amendment, given the paucity of its text.
On the Fourteenth Amendment side, the Court’s firm holding to
City of Boerne, placing the onus on Congress to pass statutes
only when a judge finds the enforcement to be remedial and
congruent and proportional, erodes the likelihood that
congressional action against political gerrymandering, unlikely
as it is in today’s political climate, will withstand judicial
scrutiny.313
Shelby County and Rucho stifle both congressional and
judicial actions to guarantee voting and representative
government under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
By not allowing Congress to take the lead in the former and not
taking the lead in the latter, the Court hamstrung federal
initiatives. Under both decisions Congress can intervene to
protect equal and fair representation and to guard against group
discrimination. The ratification process of the Reconstruction
Amendments, to include the historical mode of analysis, makes
clear the need for federal legislative policy.314 The Roberts
Court, on the other hand, has (as had the Rehnquist Court
before it) weakened the powers critical to reconstruction of
federal government, affecting congressional initiatives to
protect rights, equality, and voting.315
311. Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 597–98, 608–09
(M.D.N.C. 2018); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; id. amend. I; id. art. I, § 4.
312. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2504–05.
313. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). For an
extensive discussion of that case’s limitations on congressional enforcement
see supra notes 240–241 and accompanying text.
314. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—and Thus of
Section 5, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 109, 112 (2013) (detailing the “Reconstruction
Republicans’” aims during debates on ratification).
315. The Court has also allowed states to undermine voting through
restrictive initiatives. During the 2019–2020 term, in Raysor v. DeSantis,
Justice Sotomayor wrote in dissent from denial of application to vacate stay
that the majority “continues a trend of condoning disfranchisement,” No.
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IV. LEGISLATIVE RECONSTRUCTION
Rather than the weak and strong forms of judicial review
suggested by scholarship reviewed in Part I, what is needed is a
balance of powers between the Supreme Court and Congress.
Each can function as an independent branch of authority to
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. This Part reflects on
the extent to which the judiciary must defer to federal policies
that advance civil rights and civil liberties. It argues that as a
matter of legislative prerogative and a vestige of Reconstruction
history, Congress has authority to pass laws reasonably related
to the enforcement of enumerated autonomy, equality, or voting
rights. The Reconstruction Amendments empowered Congress,
not the Court, to be the primary branch of government for
identifying rights, setting policies, and promulgating laws
consistent and implicit in their texts. Moreover, their
substantive provisions—the prohibition against the incidents of
slavery and involuntary servitude; the provisions on citizenship,
privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection; and
the safeguards against racist voting requirements—are value
rich. The powers of Congress to identify and pass laws affecting
civil and civic rights are tied to the first principles of government
found in the Declaration of Independence and Preamble to the
Constitution.

19A1071, 2020 WL 4006868, at *4 (U.S. July 16, 2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting from denial of application to vacate stay), making clear allusion to
Shelby County. She criticized the Court’s decision in Raysor to allow a state
law to effectively disenfranchise 800,000 otherwise-eligible voters. A state
constitutional ballot initiative had granted voting privileges to persons who
had completed the term of their sentence for felony conviction, except persons
convicted of murder and sex offense. Jones v. DeSantis, No. 19CV300, 2020
WL 2618062, at *3 (N.D. Fla. May 24, 2020) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4),
hearing en banc ordered sub nom. McCoy v. Governor of Fla., No. 20-12003,
2020 WL 4012843 (11th Cir. July 1, 2020). The majority of the Court allowed
a state legislative initiative meant to undermine the state constitution, which
provided that ex-felons would only be restored their voting rights upon
payment of fees, fines, costs, and restitution. Id. at *4. Thereby, the legislature
created a wealth requirement, analogous to poll taxes, which the majority
allowed to stand.
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A.

Congressional Discretion & Judicial Deference

After the Civil War, the Constitution expanded
congressional enforcement. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments bolstered the national legislature’s
authority to rebuild the country according to first principles,
while radically expanding the powers of the federal government
from those granted at the founding.316 National government
remained limited, however; contracts, torts, family, criminal,
and testamentary law remained under the auspices of the
states.
The change in government powers was, nevertheless,
dramatic. From the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment,
Congress was granted authority to pass laws rationally related
to core values necessary for dismantling remaining badges and
incidents of slavery, thereby establishing national norms for the
enjoyment of liberty. Early laws, passed shortly after the
Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification, restructured the
government by prohibiting racial discriminations in contracting
and purchasing.317 Federal laws securing these freedoms,
irrespective of race, demonstrated the breadth of implied
authority.318 It has been understood since McCulloch v.
Maryland that Congress enjoys power implicitly arising from
enumerated constitutional provisions to pass “appropriate
316. Republican supporters of ratification sought “a practical application
of that self-evident truth that [all men] are endowed by their creator with
certain unalienable rights.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865).
317. Four statutes initially emerged to enforce the Amendment: The Civil
Rights Act of 1866, the Slave Kidnapping Act of 1866, the Peonage Act of 1867,
and the 1867 amendment to the Judiciary Act. See Civil Rights Act of 1866,
ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (1994))
(requiring all people born in U.S. to have some rights in property, contracts
and personal security); Slave Kidnapping Act of 1866, ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50
(holding as criminal anyone who kidnaps or induces any person to board a
vessel or go any place for purpose of making him or her a slave); Peonage Act
of 1867, Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (expanding scope of
habeas corpus statutes).
318. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438–44 (1968). The
concept of freedom for those who ratified the Constitution was not solely
abstract but tied to the institution of slavery and its opposite. See Michael
Vorenberg, Citizenship and the Thirteenth Amendment, in THE PROMISES OF
LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT 58, 64 (Alexander Tsesis ed. 2010).
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legislation” for achieving legitimate ends.319 This applies not
only to Article I, § 8 grants but also to those enforcement clauses
ratified after the Civil War. Those three grant the same degree
of discretionary powers for adopting the “appropriate
legislation” for the advancement of civil rights and civil
liberties.320
The Reconstruction Amendments empowered Congress to
confirm the republican ideal envisioned by the general welfare
provisions of the Preamble to the Constitution.321 Opponents to
those constitutional changes advocated states’ rights to support
racism that had predominated since constitutional
ratification.322 They understood the radical restructuring of
government that constitutional amendments forebode and

319. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.”); see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650–51 (1966)
(“Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment grants Congress a similar power to
enforce by ‘appropriate legislation’ the provisions of that amendment.”).
320. See Balkin, supra note 236, at 1807 (“The framers of the
Reconstruction Amendments sought to ensure that the test of McCulloch
would apply to the new powers created by the Reconstruction Amendments;
that is why they included the word ‘appropriate’ in the text of all three
enforcement clauses.”); see Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 747, 822–27 (1999) (writing of Congress’s authority to pass appropriate
legislation under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments); McConnell,
supra note 237, at 178 n.153 (1997) (asserting that the framers of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment expected them
to be interpreted pursuant to the Necessary and Proper analysis of McCulloch
v. Maryland).
321. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 222 (1865) (stating that
the Preamble is a repository of moral and political truths which should guide
formulation to any amendments); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2955
(1864) (asserting that constitutional Reconstruction were to achieve the “object
of this Constitution . . . admirably expressed in its preamble”).
322. Several opponents to the Thirteenth Amendment adopted racist
ideology. For example, Democratic Senator Lazarus Powell believed the U.S.
government “was made by white men and for white men.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1484 (1864). Sometimes this racial prejudice would adopt
religious overtone such as when Delaware Senator Willard Saulsbury
pronounced that God’s “providence is inequality.” Id. at 1442.
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sought to retain state control over slavery and its incidents of
unfreedom.323
Congress’s powers to pass laws, such as the Religious
Freedom and Restoration Act324 or Voting Rights Act,325 arise
from its power to secure the fundamental freedoms. In such
matters, implicitly connected to enumerated powers of the First
Amendment and Fifteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction
Amendments require the Court to defer to Congress.326 Judicial
finality in striking legislative civil rights and civil liberties
policies undermines the text, structure, values, and history of
§ 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Contrary to
the Court’s recent interpretive exclusivity in cases like City of
Boerne, Morrison, and Shelby County, Congress should enjoy the
prerogatives of setting rational policies to enact laws for
freedom, equal rights, and voting privileges.
When Congress expands civil rights pursuant to
appropriate legislation reasonably crafted to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments, principles of constitutional
reconstruction and their text require the judiciary to defer.
Those three additions to the Constitution critically diminished
the Court’s ability to thwart civil rights legislation as it had
prior to the Civil War, in Dred Scott.
Judiciary power, as we saw in Part II, is critical to
protecting discrete and insular minorities, fundamental rights,
and democratic voting. On the other hand, as Part III
demonstrated, the Supreme Court overstepped its review
function by vetoing statutes that reasonably advanced the
legitimate government ends of safeguarding the free exercise of
religion, providing causes of action for disability discrimination,

323. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1864) (noting the
statement of Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky, who argued that State
legislatures had the power to define “joining the rebel arms . . . which produces
the forfeiture of the right of suffrage” as a crime).
324. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
325. 52 U.S.C. § 10101.
326. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 236, at 1822 (“The framers of the
Thirteenth Amendment assumed that Congress would define the badges and
incidents of slavery and decide what legislation was appropriate to eliminate
them, and that the courts would defer to any reasonable construction.”).
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protecting voting rights against racial redistriction, and
preventing sex discrimination. The judiciary should be
deferential in cases reviewing congressional expansion of civil
and political rights. On the other hand, heightened scrutiny is
appropriate where legislators strip a judicially created
protection.327 That balance is lacking in Tushnet and Waldron;
nor is proportional thinking of those coequal branches
adequately accounted for in Strauss or Dworkin.328
Both the judiciary and Congress make policy decisions that
must be consistent with the post-Reconstruction structure of
government, traditions and the people’s collective conscience
about fundamental principles,329 and grants of authority. The
Constitution, in the words of Justice Brennan, is a “living
charter.”330 Both the legislature and judiciary are responsible for
its evolution from a document that protected slavery to one that
guarantees fundamental liberties, equal protection, and racially
neutral voting. The Constitution did not grant to the Court a
monopoly on the exercise of “reasoned judgment”331 on such
matters. As a legal phenomenon, the Court’s encroachments are
instances of judicial hubris that undermine explicit
reconstruction powers to pass laws in matters arising from the
principles of fairness, equality, and representative democracy.
Congress is often better able to quickly address public
matters because lawmakers are not constrained by judicial rules
of standing, ripeness, mootness, evidence, and the like. In many
contexts, this enables Congress to deliberate on information for
formulating laws that would be unavailable to courts under
rules of evidence, including a large variety of top secret
intelligence reports, constituent letters and petitions, and
empirical data. The added depth not only allows legislators to
327. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(discussing when heightened scrutiny applies).
328. See supra Part I.
329. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring) (discussing the Court’s protection of fundamental rights).
330. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
331. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (discussing the judicial role in interpreting personal
autonomy); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 663 (2015) (same).
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amass more information than a judicial record reveals, but also
to rely on theories of political science, education, financing,
philosophy, literature, sociology, anthropology, economics, and
so forth that are outside the purview of judicial competence.
These conditions of governance enable Congress to rely on the
enforcement powers of the Reconstruction Amendments without
heightened scrutiny.
Enforcement legislation should be judged by whether it is a
reasonable interpretation of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments. None of these confine legislative
enforcement to judicial definitions. To the contrary, they are
broad grants for enacting legislation consistent with the
aspiration ideal of constitutional reconstruction, which includes
structural mechanism against the judicial overreach of Dred
Scott. Congress does not have plenary power but is limited by
the substantive provisions of those three amendments.332 This
does not, however, justify the Court’s automatic rejection of
legislative initiatives not grounded in existing jurisprudence.
B.

Proportionality of Review and Enforcement

A method of interpretation is needed that falls neither into
the populist indeterminacy offered by Tushnet and Waldron nor
the judicial supremacy tendered by Strauss and Dworkin.333
Both courts and legislatures should play a role in protecting
fundamental rights.
There are good reasons to distrust all three branches of
government. Judicial finality is not immune from error. The
Reconstruction Amendments were meant to cure the defect in
the early Constitution by providing the people’s representatives
with power to pass laws consistent with freedom and equality
332. The Reconstruction powers over civil rights are not all encompassing;
there is much that remains to discuss in future work. Among the most pressing
are true conflicts between separate state claims of rights, speech, and religion.
This topic must be addressed not by looking, as does this article, to the
Reconstruction Amendments, which give power to the United States Congress,
but to state powers over civil rights laws of general applicability. No cases
better exemplify this issue than Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) and State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc.,
389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
333. See supra Part I.
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principles.334 As Part III of this Article highlighted, the Court
has often relied on formalistic modes of interpretation to prevent
the exercise of congressional civil rights authority. Although
space constraints limit the ability to discuss with as great detail,
suffice to say that it is self-evident that legislatures too can pass
inimical legislation such as the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and
1850335 and to a different degree the Defense of Marriage Act.
(DOMA)336 Without adequate judicial review, the Court upheld
the former during antebellum times.337 But the Court
demonstrated the importance of Carolene Products heightened
review in United States v. Windsor,338 which found DOMA to be
unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds.339
The enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction
Amendments empower Congress with enumerated and
incidental authority to pass laws for advancing liberal equality
for the common good, as mandated by the Declaration of
Independence and Preamble to the Constitution.340 Congress
and the Supreme Court are at their maximum authority when
advancing civil rights and civil liberties.341 Thus, when the
Court’s definition of rights is broader and more protective than
the legislatures, judicial review should favor heightened
standards of scrutiny. On the other hand, when Congress’s
enactment protects equality, liberty and advances the general
welfare, then courts must defer to the people’s legislative
representatives. The Reconstruction Amendments granted
Congress power to formulate and enact policies advancing the
334. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
335. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
336. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996).
337. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 625–26 (1842) (invalidating a
Pennsylvania law and upholding the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 522–26 (1858) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850).
338. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
339. Id. at 775.
340. Tsesis, supra note 255, at 1626–42.
341. See id. at 1678 (“It is . . . essential that neither the Court nor
Congress hamstrings the other’s authority to safeguard essential rights for
pursuing the common good.”).
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equal enjoyment of fundamental rights and citizenship. Such a
scheme retains the judicial function of protecting individual
rights, while allowing Congress to act on initiatives crafted to
advance policies for the people’s general welfare.
To best secure constitutional rights, courts should apply
heightened scrutiny to cases set out in footnote 4 of Carolene
Products, which I elaborated upon in Part II. The strong form of
judicial veto reviewed in Part III, however, undercuts the
enforcement mandates of the Reconstruction Amendments;
thereby, the judiciary regularly thwarts Congress’s civil rights
initiatives. In City of Boerne, the majority diminished
lawmakers’ ability to protect free exercise rights under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.342 Congress relied
on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass the RFRA.343 The
aim of the legislation was to protect the free exercise of religion
under the First Amendment.344 Congress’s power to pass law to
advance the people’s entitlements under the Bill of Rights was
no match to judicial supremacy. Also in Shelby County, which
struck Congress’s § 4(b) formula to enforce the Voting Rights
Act, the Court shattered decades of political compromises made
by coalitions of lawmakers.345
As with Shelby and City of Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett, the
Court has overstepped its interpretive prerogative to halt
congressional efforts that were structurally, textually, and
normatively consistent with the principles of constitutional
reconstruction. Congress has the enforcement authority to pass
appropriate laws reasonably likely to protect the free exercise of
religion, monetary damages for state discrimination, and
preclearance review against anti-discrimination.

342. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (ruling that the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant Congress
substantive but only remedial enforcement authority).
343. Id. at 516.
344. Id. at 515–16.
345. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (holding that
the Voting Rights Act § 4(b) was unconstitutional, rendering § 5 only
constitutional by private suits rather than by defined preclearance
proceedings).
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Historical Evidence

The judicial supremacy of Cooper v. Aaron, ruled on for civil
rights purposes, has morphed into a doctrine of exclusivity that
includes Boerne, Kimel, Garrett, and Shelby County expanded.
All four cases ignore the history of the Reconstruction
Amendments by depriving Congress of its prerogative to pass
rational legislation to enforce principles of fundamental rights,
equality, and franchise. The shift to legislative power that the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments established
is evident from the Reconstruction Congress’s monumental
achievements, such as the Enforcement Acts of 1870;346 the
Second Enforcement Act of 1871;347 and, the same year, the
Third Enforcement Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan
Act.348 These statutes were passed in the immediate aftermath
of the Reconstruction Amendments’ ratification, before the
holding in the Civil Rights Cases dismissed meaningful national
civil rights reform. They point to the framers’ intent to
meaningfully restructure federalism, where Congress is
supreme in the enforcement of reasonable legislation for
equality, due process, and general welfare. These aims are
proportionate; the Court retains the jurisdiction to strike laws
passed with animus or other irrelevant reasons tending to harm
persons or groups.349
The terms of these statutes demonstrate the expanded
federal role in securing rights through the Reconstruction
Amendments. Historical analysis is consistent with U.S. legal
semantics.350
While my account is not exclusively historical—the method
of this article has also been structural, textual, and value
346. First Enforcement Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 241).
347. Second Enforcement Act, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871) (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 9; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1357, 1442, 1446–47, 1449–50).
348. Third Enforcement Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 51–55).
349. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971) (stating that
the Ku Klux Klan Act requires a finding of some racial or class-based animus).
350. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12 (1991)
(describing “constitutional modalities—the ways in which legal propositions
are characterized as true from a legal point of view”).
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rich—the appeal to history is undeniable.351 The Supreme Court
has often relied on narratives of how Congress acted during
Reconstruction to identify the range of changes created by
constitutional reconstruction.352 This Article follows this
precedential methodology to understand the range of options
available to elected officials guiding the course of civil rights
reforms. But it also recognizes something more. Professors
Michael McConnell and Bruce Ackerman have argued severally
that Reconstruction was one of those precise constitutional
moments of social change and upheaval.353 It is only logical to
examine what powers Congress exercised in the immediate
aftermath of the three amendments’ ratifications of 1865, 1868,
and 1870. Study of those statutes provides historical evidence of
what the Reconstruction Congress understood about its own

351. This is not the Article for any extensive discussion of originalism,
which I have discussed in some detail in Alexander Tsesis, Footholds of
Constitutional Interpretation, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1593, 1597–98 (2013). For more
thorough discussions of the issue, see Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the
New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 716–36 (2011) (discussing the varying
theoretical approaches that fall under the rubrics of Old and New
Originalism); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 339 (2011) (arguing that
living originalism “offer[s] us the means to prevent bad decisions from
occurring in the first place”); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 225 (1980).
352. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 741 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (reviewing the history that led to the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
423– 35 (1968) (discussing 1833 congressional debates about injustices against
Black people).
353. Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11
CONST. COMMENT. 115, 122 (1994) (citing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 83 (1991)). Congressional debates on the Reconstruction
Amendments demonstrated national determination to enforce legislative
initiatives in a new federalist structure with significantly increased national
powers. Alexander Tsesis, Reconstructing the American Dream, in WE SHALL
OVERCOME: A HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE LAW 83 (2008). The House and
Senate debates on the three amendments never even mentioned the possibility
of Supreme Court overrides staying legislative authority. Prior to 1866 the
Justices had only twice found federal laws unconstitutional. See generally
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803); Dred Scott v. Sanford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1856). The degree of judicial activism from the
post-Reconstruction period to today would have been entirely foreign to
Congressmen who debated the meaning of the three amendments.
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powers before the Supreme Court began to bevel away at its
authority.
The 1870 Enforcement Act prohibited states from using
race, color, or previous condition of involuntary servitude to
interfere with the right to vote.354 Criminal penalties were
provided against election officers who refused to receive a vote,
obstructed, or intimidated citizens from voting.355 The first act
further prohibited conspirators from using disguises to prevent
others from exercising constitutional rights.356 A further sign of
the shift to nationalism was the granting of subject matter
jurisdiction to district courts of the United States, which they
held concurrently with state courts.357 Another crucial provision
reenacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, with its protections of
access to courts, contracts, and ownership.358
The Second Enforcement Act of 1871 regulated
unencumbered voting.359 Here too Congress granted subject
matter jurisdiction to federal district courts.360 The Act was
directed “primarily at Democratic practices in the North,
focused on combating irregularities in voting in large cities.”361
Of the three enforcement acts, the last passed has had the
most enduring impact on American civil rights law.362 The Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871 created private liability against “any
354. 16 Stat. 140, § 1.
355. Id. §§ 3–5.
356. Id. §§ 6–7.
357. Id. §§ 8, 23. The current jurisdiction aspect indicates the extent to
which Congress was willing to retain previously overlapping jurisdiction over
subject matter.
358. Id. § 18.
359. 16 Stat. 433 (1871) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 9; 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1357, 1442, 1446–47, 1449–50).
360. Id. § 3.
361. ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION 118 (1st ed. 2019).
362. Plaintiffs in Sines v. Kessler claimed Defendants had “formed a
conspiracy to commit the racial violence that led to the Plaintiffs’ varied
injuries” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 324 F. Supp. 3d 765, 773–74,
780– 81 (W.D. Va. 2018). A district court found it a plausible allegation that
defendants were motivated by specific invidious animus. Id. at 773, 780. In
Sines, the court found that Plaintiffs had a plausible case to pursue under the
Thirteenth Amendment to vindicate the right against racial violence under
federal law. Id. at 782.
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person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall . . . depriv[e] of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution . . . law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage.”363 The Third Enforcement Act also reiterated the
prohibition against conspiring with others or putting on a
disguise to perpetrate vigilante violence.364 And the statute also
granted a wrongful death cause of action to surviving “legal
representatives of . . . [a] deceased person.”365 Anyone
interfering with another’s “equal privileges and immunities” or
who conspires to intentionally impede hinder, obstruct, or defeat
the equal protection of laws is subject to penalty.366 This is
clearly a private action Congress regarded as necessary to parse
federal action against racist conduct. So broad was the effect on
changing federalism from exclusive state civil actions to a
federal scheme that the Third Enforcement Act remains the
source of § 1983 practice.367
With the enforcement of those three laws, Congress
expanded rights beyond any judicial mandate.368 Passage of
these laws immediately after ratification of the Reconstruction
Amendments demonstrates the increased empowerment
granted to Congress before the Court began thwarting federal
civil rights statutes in Cruikshank and Harris, both cases the
Court relied on in Boerne.369 These three enforcement statutes
from the Second Founding showed a marked increase in
Congress’s authority to pass legislation of criminal law that had
been reserved to the states under the original Constitution.
They were each to allow for national efforts against state
prejudices. The judiciary thwarted Reconstruction, striking a

363. 17 Stat. 13, § 1 (1871).
364. Id. § 2.
365. Id. § 6.
366. Id. § 2. On the relevance of the intent component of the statute see
Balkin, supra note 236, at 1842.
367. City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 (1985).
368. See Eric Foner, The Supreme Court and the History of
Reconstruction—and Vice-Versa, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1597 (2012)
(criticizing the Court’s state action doctrine).
369. 521 U.S. 507, 525 (1997).
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law of national desegregation, the Civil Rights Act of 1875.370
The same veto was used to strike the critically important
preclearance provision out of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.371
D.

Correcting Judicial Overreach

The Court’s assertion of supremacy over congressional
enforcement intrudes into legislators’ constitutionally granted
prerogatives.372 The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have
tightened the reins of power to steer constitutional
interpretation in a direction contrary to the explicit language of
the enforcement clauses. Under current doctrine,373 the Court
deploys its power of review to restrict Congress from defining its
own powers under the Reconstruction Amendments. This
undermines legislators’ ability to enact policies consistent with
the ethics behind their ratifications. The structure of
government changed to expand national authority to pass
legislation conducive to the equal dignity of persons in a
representative and constitutional democracy. The judicial and
legislative branches are jointly and severally responsible to
protect fundamental liberties, equal protections, and
non-discriminatory voting rights.374 These three can be further
boiled down to equal liberty and associational rights, or liberal
equality for the common good. However, as things stand,
consistent with the holdings in Boerne and Shelby County, the
Court can veto any prophylactic law regardless of congressional
reasoning.
The current doctrine does not square with the text of the
enforcement clauses. The enforcement clauses of the
Reconstruction Amendments granted Congress powers as broad
as the Necessary and Proper Clause.375 The first of the ratified
370. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
371. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
372. See supra notes 50–53, 218–227 and accompanying text.
373. See supra Part III.
374. I have argued elsewhere that all three branches of government should
be governed by the principle of liberal equality for the common good
established by the Preamble to the Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence. See Tsesis, supra note 255, at 1626–42.
375. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

920

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849 (2021)

Amendments, in 1865, the § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment
provided that, “Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.”376 The Fourteenth Amendment’s
fifth section authorizes similarly that, “Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.”377 And § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides, in
the same spirit and letter, “[t]he Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”378 All this sounds
like the Necessary and Proper Clause with its well known
deferential test. They closely resemble the Necessary and
Proper Clause’s grant of “the foregoing powers [in Article I, § 8
and] all other powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.”379 The enforcement clauses of the
Reconstruction Amendments were modeled from the same
deferential norm to Congress in matters of civil rights. They
grant Congress pro-active authority, not merely the power to
respond to judicially defined harms. Hence, in cases involving
statutes passed pursuant to congressional enforcement
authority only rational basis scrutiny is appropriate. This
conclusion is based on the norms, history, structure, and text of
the Reconstruction Amendments, but it calls for a reworking of
doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The Reconstruction Amendments altered the structure of
U.S. government in the realms of judicial review and legislative
enforcement. They augmented the federal government’s power
to guarantee individual liberties, civil rights, and racially
nondiscriminatory voting. Their provisions provide legislative
powers for achieving the national creed of liberal equality for the
common good first articulated in the Declaration of
Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution. The Second
Founding envisioned a federal judiciary and legislature

376.
377.
378.
379.

Id. amend. XII, § 2.
Id. amend. XIV, § 5.
Id. amend. XV, § 2.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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committed to fundamental rights; equal justice; and
representative governance, untainted by America’s history with
inequality. But by the late-nineteenth century the Supreme
Court had weakened the mandates of legislative reconstruction.
More recently, the Rehnquist and Roberts Court have further
hobbled congressional enforcement powers while bolstering
judicial veto powers.380
This Article seeks a way forward to make strides in civil
rights and civil liberties laws. A progressive balance between
adjudication and legislation is essential to maintain appropriate
checks and balances. Judicial review supplies levels of scrutiny
for identifying rights, competing interests, and proportionate
scrutiny. Heightened judicial scrutiny relies on the analytical
abilities of judges to synthesize precedents, principles, and
pragmatic judgments.381 Yet judges are not alone. Congress, like
the judiciary, is obligated to carry out constitutional mandates,
such as those found in the Reconstruction Amendments.
Relying on judicial finality to override Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment legislation began during
the post-Reconstruction period, when the Court struck laws
such as the national desegregation provisions in the Civil Rights
Cases. Even today, the Court’s veto over rights, equality, and
voting—in cases such as City of Boerne and Shelby County—
undercuts meaningful efforts to enforce the principles of
America’s constitutional reconstruction.

380. See supra Part III.
381. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(discussing heightened judicial review).

